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This paper investigates consumer switching costs in the context of health insurance markets, where
adverse selection is a potential concern. Though previous work has studied these phenomena in isolation,
they interact in a way that directly impacts market outcomes and consumer welfare. Our identification
strategy leverages a unique natural experiment that occurred at a large firm where we also observe
individual-level panel data on health insurance choices and medical claims. We present descriptive
results to show that (i) switching costs are large and (ii) adverse selection is present. To formalize
this analysis we develop and estimate a choice model that jointly quantifies switching costs, risk preferences,
and ex ante health risk. We use these estimates to study the welfare impact of an information provision
policy that nudges consumers toward better decisions by reducing switching costs. This policy increases
welfare in a naive setting where insurance plan prices are held fixed. However, when insurance prices
change endogenously to reflect updated enrollee risk pools, the same policy substantially exacerbates
adverse selection and reduces consumer welfare, doubling the existing welfare loss from adverse selection.
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A number of potential impediments stand in the way of ecient health insurance markets. The most
noted of these is adverse selection, rst studied by Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
In insurance markets, prices reect the expected risk (costs) of the insured pool. Whether the
reason is price regulation or private information, when insurers cannot price all risk characteristics
riskier consumers choose more comprehensive health plans. This causes the equilibrium prices of
these plans to rise and healthier enrollees to select less comprehensive coverage than they would
otherwise prefer.
A second less studied, but potentially important, impediment is poor health plan choice by
consumers. A collection of research summarized by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) presents strong
evidence that consumer decisions are heavily inuenced by context and can systematically depart
from those that would be made in a rational frictionless environment. These decision-making issues
may be magnied when the costs and benets of each option are dicult to evaluate, as in the
market for health insurance. In the recently passed Aordable Care Act (ACA), policymakers
emphasized clear and simple standardized insurance benet descriptions as one way to improve
consumer choices from plan menus oered through proposed exchanges.1 If consumers do not have
the information or abilities to adequately choose an insurance plan, there can be an immediate
eciency loss from consumers not maximizing their individual well-being and a long term eciency
loss from not transmitting the appropriate price signals to the competitive marketplace.
In this work we empirically investigate how one source of choice inadequacy, switching costs,
interacts with adverse selection in the context of an employer-sponsored insurance setting typical of
the U.S. health care system.2 Each respective literature has studied these phenomena in isolation
from one another: to our knowledge this is the rst work that studies them in tandem. In health
insurance markets, this interaction matters because choice adequacy impacts plan enrollment, which
in turn determines average costs and subsequent premiums. Thus, if there are substantial barriers
to decision-making this can have a large impact on the extent of adverse selection and, consequently,
consumer welfare. Policies designed to improve consumer choice will have a theoretically ambiguous
welfare eect as the impact of better decision making conditional on prices is traded o with
potentially increased adverse selection. This stands in stark contrast to previous work on choice
inadequacy where policies designed to improve consumer choices can only have a positive welfare
impact.
We study individual-level health plan choice and health claims data for the employees of a
large rm and their dependents. The data contain a unique natural experiment that we leverage
to identify switching costs separately from persistent consumer preference heterogeneity. The rm
1Advocates of managed competition in health insurance generally cite policies to help consumers make better
decisions as a key component of market regulation (see e.g. Enthoven et al. (2001)).
2In 2009, 55.8% of all individuals in the United States (169 million people) received insurance through their
employer or the employer of a family member (DeNavas-Walk et al. (2010)). The amount of money at stake in this
settting is large: in 2010 the average total premium (employer plus employee contribution) for an employer provided
insurance plan was $5,049 for single coverage and $13,770 for family coverage (Kaiser Family Foundation (2010a)).
1implemented a major change to their employee insurance program in the middle of the six years
of data we observe. The rm substantially changed their menu of ve health plan oerings, forced
employees out of the health plans they had been enrolled in, and required them to actively choose
a plan from the new menu with no stated default option. In subsequent years, the insurance plan
options remained the same but consumers had their previously chosen plan as a default option,
implying they would continue to be enrolled in that plan if they took no action. This was despite
the fact that employee premiums changed markedly over time such that many would have beneted
from switching their plan. When combined with other features of the data, our ability to observe
the same consumers in clearly active and clearly passive choice environments over time allows us to
cleanly identify switching costs.
We present descriptive tests based on the data alone that suggest the presence of large switching
costs. Our rst test for switching costs studies the behavior of new employees at the rm. As plan
prices and the choice environment change over time, incoming cohorts of new employees make active
choices that reect the updated setting while prior cohorts of new employees make markedly dierent
choices that reect the past choice setup, though they are similar on all other dimensions. A second
test studies specic cases that arise in our environment where certain groups of consumers have one
of their health plan options become completely dominated by another due to price changes over
time. The majority of consumers who face this scenario continue to choose a plan once it becomes
dominated, despite the fact that all of them should switch in a frictionless market. Additionally,
we present a simple test for adverse selection that clearly reveals that higher health risk employees
choose more comprehensive coverage.
While these tests show that switching costs and adverse selection are important in our environ-
ment, to precisely measure these eects and understand the impact of counterfactual policies we
develop a structural choice model that jointly quanties switching costs, risk preferences, and ex
ante health risk. In the model, consumers make choices that maximize their expected utilities over
all plan options conditional on their risk tastes and health risk distributions.3 In the forced active
choice periods consumers have zero switching costs, while in periods that they have an incumbent
(default) plan option switching costs reduce the utility of alternative options relative to the status
quo option. We allow for heterogeneity in both switching costs and risk preferences so that we have
the richest possible understanding of how consumers select plans. Though not our primary focus,
our risk preference estimates are interesting in their own right as we are aware of only a few previous
papers that quantify heterogeneous risk preferences in a non-experimental setting (see e.g. Cohen
and Einav (2007) or Chiappori et al. (2008)).
To model health risk perceived by employees at the time of plan choice, we develop a novel
out-of-pocket expense model that builds on the prior work of Carlin and Town (2009). The model
incorporates past diagnostic and cost information into individual-level and plan-specic expense
projections using both (i) sophisticated predictive software developed at Johns Hopkins Medical
School and (ii) a detailed model of how dierent types of medical claims translate to out-of-pocket
3In a recent survey of the empirical insurance literature, Einav et al. (2010a) refer to this kind of model that
directly estimates expected utility function parameters as a `realized' utility model.
2expenditures in each plan. The cost model outputs a family-plan-time specic distribution of
predicted out-of-pocket expenditure distribution that we incorporate into expected utility model
under the assumption that consumer beliefs about future health expenditures conform to our cost
model estimates.4 This cost prediction framework directly advances our primary goals of (i) precisely
quantifying switching costs and (ii) understanding how plan average costs, and adverse selection,
change as enrollment patterns do.
Our choice model estimates reveal that switching costs are high with some substantial hetero-
geneity, modeled as a function of observable family characteristics. In our primary specication, an
average family has switching costs of $2,032 while the population standard deviation is $446. An
employee covering at least one dependent has, on average, $751 higher switching costs than a single
employee while an employee that enrolls in a exible spending account (FSA) is estimated to have
$551 lower switching costs than one who does not. These estimates are economically signicant rel-
ative to the average level of total employee spending of approximately $4,500. Our risk preference
estimates reveal that consumers have a meaningful degree of risk aversion, suggesting that there
are, on average, substantial benets from incremental insurance. We present a variety of robustness
analyses to demonstrate that our parameter estimates are quite stable with respect to some of the
underlying assumptions in our primary specication.
We apply these estimates to study a counterfactual policy intervention where consumer switching
costs are reduced from our baseline estimates. Increased and targeted information provision to
consumers is one oft-discussed policy that has the potential to reduce switching costs, though our
counterfactual analysis applies to any proposed policies that have the potential to do so.5 We allow
for a range of policy interventions spanning ones that do not change switching costs to those that
completely eliminate them. In order to assess the impact of reduced switching costs, it is necessary
to model the supply-side of the insurance market. To this end, we construct an insurance pricing
model that closely follows the way employee premiums were determined in the rm we study. In
our framework, plan premiums equal the average costs of enrollees from the prior period plus an
administrative fee, conditional on the number of dependents covered. The rm provides employees
with a at subsidy towards these premiums, implying that consumers pay the full marginal cost of
more comprehensive insurance. This pricing environment is very similar to that studied in prior
work on insurance markets by, e.g., Cutler and Reber (1998) and Einav et al. (2010b). It also closely
resembles the competitive environment of the insurance exchanges recently proposed in the ACA,
though there are some specic dierences we highlight.
4The cost model assumes that there is no (i) consumer-level private information or (ii) moral hazard. While
we believe these are potentially important phenomena in insurance markets, in our setting these eects are likely
quite small compared to switching costs and selection on the detailed observable information we use. We present a
robustness analysis that incorporates estimates from the moral hazard literature to illustrate this point. An earlier
version of this paper presented empirical evidence that the combined eect of these two phenomena is not large in
our setting (Handel (2010)).
5Distinguishing between potential underlying sources of switching costs is important to determine which specic
information provision policy will reduce switching costs. In this analysis, we take for granted that there are policies
that can reduce switching costs and don't focus on specic policies. Our welfare analysis incorporates the range of
potential underlying sources, which we discuss in greater detail in section 7.
3In the naive case where plan prices do not change as a result of the dierent enrollment patterns
caused by the intervention, a three-quarter reduction in switching costs substantially improves
consumer choices over time. This policy leads to a $105 (5.2%) mean per person per year welfare
increase, measured as the certainty equivalent change as a percentage of employee premiums paid.
In the primary policy analysis, where insurance prices endogenously respond to dierent enrollment
and cost patterns, the results are quite dierent. The same policy that reduces switching costs
by three-quarters still improves consumer choices conditional on prices, but now also exacerbates
adverse selection, leading to a 7.7% reduction in welfare. In this more uid marketplace, consumers
who are healthy and value comprehensive insurance can no longer reasonably purchase it because
of the high relative premiums caused by acute sorting. This intervention essentially doubles the
existing 8.2% welfare loss from adverse selection in our observed environment, a gure that much of
the literature focuses on. We also nd, more generally, that welfare is decreasing as the intervention
to reduce switching costs becomes more eective. There are substantial distributional consequences
resulting from the reduction in switching costs, in addition to the overall eciency loss. Our welfare
analysis accounts for the dierent potential underlying sources of switching costs by considering a
spectrum of cases ranging from the one where switching costs are a true social cost that is fully
incorporated into the welfare calculation to the case where switching costs only matter for the
choices they engender and do not enter the welfare calculation themselves. The negative welfare
impact across the set of policies we consider continues to hold for nearly all welfare treatments of
switching costs.
This paper contributes to several distinct literatures. The clean identication of switching costs
we obtain from the plan re-design and forced active re-enrollment resolves a primary issue in the
empirical literature on switching costs. Farrell and Klemperer (2007) survey this literature and
discuss how the inability of researchers to observe active or initial choices within a micro-level panel
data set confounds their ability to separately identify switching costs from persistent unobserved
preference heterogeneity. The authors note that prior papers that attempt to quantify switching
costs generally rely on less direct methods with stronger identifying assumptions. Shum (2004)
is a notable example that studies switching costs with panel data in the context of the breakfast
cereal markets. Crawford et al. (2011) and Goettler and Clay (2010) are other recent studies that
study switching costs with panel data in the xed-line telephone and grocery delivery markets
respectively. There are also extensive empirical marketing literatures on brand loyalty and state
dependence, phenomena that are similar in spirit to switching costs (see e.g. Dube et al. (2008) or
Dube et al. (2010)).
There is a related literature that studies the eects of inertia in various contexts, such as health
insurance (e.g. Strombom et al. (2002) and Ericson (2010)) and 401(k) plan choice (Madrian and
Shea (2001)).6 Our work diers from these papers on several dimensions including that (i) we
6Madrian and Shea (2001) cleanly identies the eect of inertia stemming using a change in the default options
for the 401(k) choices of the employees at a large rm. They nd that inertia has a substantial impact on 401(k)
enrollment and elections. Their work is similar in spirit to our descriptive analysis of new employee health plan choice,
though their analysis also expands on this angle to draw a variety of additional conclusions.
4quantify switching costs, risk preferences, and ex ante health risk with a choice model and (ii) we
study switching costs together with adverse selection in a setting with endogenous pricing. Abaluck
and Gruber (2011) use a micro-level data set with plan choices and medical claims in Medicare Part
D together with an empirical choice model to show that elderly consumers exhibit specic decision
biases that reduce welfare when prices are held xed, as in our naive model.
This paper builds on the prior work that studies the existence and consequences of adverse
selection in health insurance markets. Our insurance choice model relates to the approach of Cardon
and Hendel (2001), which is also similar to the approaches used in Carlin and Town (2009), Bundorf
et al. (2010), and Einav et al. (2011). These papers model selection as a function of expected health
risk and study the welfare loss from adverse selection in their observed settings relative to the rst-
best. Our work is the rst in this literature to identify and estimate switching costs and investigate
the interaction between switching costs and adverse selection. In fact, to our knowledge, this is the
rst paper in the literature to quantify the interaction between any source of choice inadequacy and
adverse selection. Additionally, our cost model makes a methodological contribution by showing
how to incorporate medical diagnostics and detailed health plan characteristics into individual-level
out-of-pocket expense distribution predictions. Using dierent underlying empirical frameworks,
Cutler and Reber (1998) and Einav et al. (2010b) also study the welfare consequences of adverse
selection in the context of large self-insured employers. For a more in depth discussion of this
literature see the recent survey by Einav et al. (2010a).
Our analysis of switching costs and adverse selection also adds to the empirical literature that
studies the impact of insurance selection on preference dimensions separate from risk. Cutler et al.
(2008), Cutler et al. (2009), Fang et al. (2008), and Einav et al. (2011) study alternative dimensions
of selection in health insurance markets (e.g. risk preferences and moral hazard) while Cohen and
Einav (2007) and Einav et al. (2010c) use empirical choice models to study such dimensions in
auto insurance and annuity markets respectively. Switching costs are a new potential dimension of
selection that diers from those previously studied because it leads to specic selection patterns as
consumers and the marketplace change over time (as opposed to a purely static context).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data with an emphasis on how
the health insurance choice environment evolves at the rm over time. Section 3 presents descriptive
tests based on the data alone that show the presence of both switching costs and adverse selection.
Section 4 presents our empirical choice framework while section 5 presents the structural estimates
from this model. Section 6 presents a model of insurance pricing, describes our welfare framework,
and investigates the impact of counterfactual policies that reduce switching costs relative to our
estimates. Section 7 discusses and section 8 concludes.
2 Data and Environment
We study the health insurance choices and medical utilization of employees (and their dependents)
at a large U.S. based rm over the time period from 2004 to 2009. In a year during this period
5that we denote t0 (to protect the identity of the rm) the rm changed the menu of health plans it
oered to employees and introduced an entirely new set of PPO plan options.7 At the time of this
change, the rm forced all employees to leave their prior plan and actively re-enroll in one of ve
options from the new menu, with no default option. The rm made a substantial eort to ensure
that employees made active choices at t0 by continuously contacting them via physical mail and
email to communicate both information about the new insurance program and that there would be
no default option.8 In the years prior to and following the active choice year t0, employees were
allowed to default into their previously chosen plan option without taking any action, despite the
fact that in several cases plan prices changed signicantly from one year to the next. This variation
in the structure of the default option over time, together with the plan menu change, is a unique
feature of the data set that makes it especially well suited to study switching costs because, for
each longer-term employee, we observe at least one choice where switching costs could be present
and one choice where they are not.
These proprietary panel data include the health insurance options available in each year, em-
ployee plan choices, and detailed, claim-level employee (and dependent) medical expenditure and
utilization information.9 We use this detailed medical information together with medical risk pre-
diction software developed at Johns Hopkins Medical School to develop individual-level measures
of predicted future medical utilization at each point in time. These measures are generated using
past diagnostic, expense, and demographic information and allow us to precisely gauge medical
expenditure risk at the time of plan choice in the context of our cost model. 10 Additionally, we
observe a rich set of employee demographics including job characteristics, age, gender, income, and
job tenure, along with the age, gender, and type of each dependent. Together with data on other
relevant choices (e.g. exible spending account (FSA) contributions, dental insurance) we use these
characteristics to study switching cost and risk preference heterogeneity.
Sample Composition and Demographics. The rm we study employs approximately 9,000
people per year. The rst column of Table 1 describes the demographic prole of the 11,253 em-
ployees who work at the rm for some stretch within 2004-2009. These employees cover 9,710
7This change had the two stated goals of (i) encouraging employees to choose new, higher out-of-pocket spending
plans in order to help control total medical spending and (ii) providing employees with a broader choice of dierent
health insurance options (e.g. a consumer driven health plan with a linked health savings account (HSA)).
8Eventually, though they were not told this ahead of time, the approximately 0.6% employees that did not actively
elect a given plan were all enrolled in one option so that they would not lose out on this valuable benet.
9We observe this detailed medical data for all employees and dependents enrolled in one of several PPO options,
which is the set of available plans our analysis focuses on. For a further discussion see the sample composition section.
These data include detailed claim-level diagnostic information, such as ICD-9 codes and NDC drug codes, as well as
provider information and a detailed payment breakdown (e.g. deductible paid, coinsurance paid, plan paid).
10This program, known as the Johns Hopkins ACG (Adjusted Clinical Groups) Case-Mix System, is one of the
most widely used and respected risk adjustment and predictive modeling packages in the health care sector. It
was specically designed to use diagnostic claims data, such as the individual-level ICD-9 codes we observe, to
predict future medical expenditures in a sophisticated manner. In addition, the program takes into account the NDC
pharmaceutical drug utilization codes we observe as well as individual age and gender. For more information on this
program visit http : ==www:acg:jhsph:edu=html=AboutACGs whois:htm. Other recent work by Carlin and Town
(2009), Bundorf et al. (2010), and Einav et al. (2011) uses similar software.
6dependents, implying a total of 20,963 covered lives. 46.7% of the employees are male and the
mean employee age is 40.1 (median of 37). We observe income grouped into ve tiers, the rst
four of which are approximately $40,000 increments, increasing from 0, with the fth for employees
that earn more than $176,000. Almost 40% of employees have income in tier 2, between $41,000
and $72,000, with 34% less than $41,000 and the remaining 26% in the three income tiers greater
than $72,000. 58% of employees cover only themselves with health insurance, with the other 42%
covering a spouse and/or dependent(s). 23% of the employees are managers, 48% are white-collar
employees who are not managers, and the remaining 29% are blue-collar employees. 13% of the
employees are categorized as `quantitatively sophisticated' managers. Finally, the table presents
information on the mean and median characteristics of the zip codes the employees live in.
We construct our nal sample to leverage the features of the data that allow us to identify
switching costs. Moving from the full data, we restrict the nal sample to employees (and depen-
dents) who (i) are enrolled in a health plan for all years from t 1 to t1 and (ii) are enrolled in a PPO
option in each of those years (excluding the employees that enroll in either of two HMO options).11
The second column in Table 1 describes the sample of employees who ever enroll in a PPO option
at the rm (N = 5,667), while the third column describes the nal sample (N = 2,023). Comparing
column 2 to column 1, it is evident that the restriction to PPO options engenders minimal selection
based on the rich set of demographics we observe. Comparing both of these columns to column
three reveals that the additional restriction that employees be enrolled for three consecutive years
does lead to some sample selection, though not a substantial amount. Employees in the nal sam-
ple are slightly older, slightly richer, and more likely to cover additional family members than the
overall PP0 population. Note that the primary impact of the restriction that employees be enrolled
the entire three year period is to exclude employees who enter or exit the rm during that period,
rather than exclude employees who switch to an HMO option or waive coverage.
There are costs and benets of these two restrictions. The restriction to PPO plans is advan-
tageous because we observe detailed medical claims data only for enrollees in these plans and these
plans are only dierentiated by nancial characteristics, implying we don't have to consider hetero-
geneity in preferences over provider network when modeling choice between them.12 A potential
cost is that this restriction may bias the choice model by restricting the set of options. In the
upcoming descriptive analysis of plan choices we show clear evidence that the nest of PPO options
and nest of HMO options are quite horizontally dierentiated from one another, implying a limited
within-sample bias from excluding HMO choices.
The restriction that employees enroll in a plan in every year from t 1 to t1 has the benet that,
for each individual in the nal sample, we observe a past year of medical data for each choice span-
ning t0 (the active choice year) to t2. This allows us to model health risk at the time of each choice
from an ex ante perspective, permitting a more precise characterization of out-of-pocket expense
11We denote all years in reference to t0, such that, e.g., year t 1 occurred just before t0 and year t1 just after.
12This implies that, ultimately, the switching costs that we study exclude potential switching costs that come from
having to change your medical provide when you move to a new health plan. Thus, our estimates can be interpreted
as a lower bound on switching costs in a more general setting where this factor is potentially important.
7risk and the choice model parameters. This restriction has two costs: (i) it reduces the sample size
and (ii) it excludes new employees from t0 to t2, who, as the upcoming preliminary analysis section
reveals, can provide an additional source of identication for switching costs.13 Ultimately, since
the identication within the nal sample for switching costs is quite strong because of the plan
menu change and linked active decision, we feel that having a more precise model is worth the costs
of this restriction.14
Health Insurance Choices. From 2004 to t 1 the rm oered ve total health plan options
composed of four HMO plans (smaller provider network, more integration with providers) and one
PPO plan (broader network, less integration). Each of these ve plans had a dierent network of
providers, dierent contracts with providers, and dierent premiums and cost-sharing formulas for
enrollees. From t0 on, the new plan menu contained two of the four incumbent HMO plans and
three new PPO plans.15 This plan structure remained intact through the end of the data in 2009.
After the menu change, the HMOs still had dierent provider networks and cost sharing rules both
relative to each other and to the set of new PPOs. However, as mentioned, the three new PPO
plans introduced at t0 had exactly the same network of providers, the same contractual treatment
of providers, and cover the same medical services. The PPO plans are only dierentiated from
one another (and from the previously oered PPO) by premiums and cost sharing characteristics
that determine the mapping from total medical expenditures (employee paid plus employer paid) to
employee out-of-pocket expenditures (e.g. deductible, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket maximums).
Throughout the period, all PPO options that the rm oers are self-insured plans where the rm
lls the primary role of the insurer and is at risk for incurred claims. We denote the HMO plans
available throughout the entire period as HMO1 and HMO2, and those oered only before the
menu change as HMO3 and HMO4. We denote the PPO option from before the menu change as
PPO 1, while we we denote each of the PPO options after the menu change by their respective
individual-level deductibles: PPO250, PPO500 and PPO1200.16 PPO1200 is paired with a health
savings account (HSA) option that allows consumers to deposit tax-free dollars to be used later to
pay medical expenditures.17
13Note also that this restriction excludes employees who exit before t1, but that these employees would only have
one choice in the active choice year in the model, making them less useful for identication of switching costs.
14If we included new employees after t 1 we could use a less precise cost framework for these employees in the
absence of detailed medical information. This could be based on future claims or demographics such as age and sex,
similarly to what is done in the rest of the literature when detailed claims information is not available.
15Any employee who chose a PPO plan at t0, by denition, had to be actively choosing an entirely new plan. An
employee was enrolled in HMO1 or HMO2 prior to t0 was still forced out of that plan and prompted to make an
active choice from the new menu, though those plans remained available. Since we only study PPO plans after t0,
the incumbent aspect of the HMO plans does not impact our analysis.
16The deductibles can be linked directly to how comprehensive (proportion of health expenses paid for) each plan
is overall. Thus, PPO250 is the most comprehensive (and highest premium) option, PPO500 is in the middle, and
PPO1200 is the least comprehensive (lowest premium).
17This may lead to some degree of horizontal dierentiation for this plan relative to the other two, which we account
for in the choice model. This kind of plan is known as a `high-deductible health plan' or `consumer driven health
plan'. Employees who signed up for this plan for the rst time were given up to a $1,200 HSA match from the rm,
which we account for in our analysis.
8Table 2 presents the detailed characteristics of the PPO plans oered after the menu change
at t0. After the deductibles are paid, PPO250 has a coinsurance rate of 10% while the other two
plans have rates of 20%, implying they have double the marginal price of post-deductible claims.
Out-of-pocket maximums indicate the maximum amount of medical expenditures that an enrollee
can pay post-premium in a given plan. These are larger the less comprehensive the plan is and vary
with income tier. Finally, both PPO250 and PPO500 have the same at-fee copayment structures
for pharmaceuticals and physician oce visits, while in PPO1200 these apply to the deductible
and coinsurance.18 While we model these characteristics at a high-level of detail, our cost model
necessarily makes some simplfying assumptions that we discuss and validte in Appendix A.
The top panel in Figure 1 compares plans PPO250 and PPO500 graphically, to illustrate the
relationship between health plan nancial characteristic and employee out-of-pocket expenses. The
gure studies this relationship at t0 (premiums dier each year) and describes employee out-of-
pocket expenditures as a function of total medical expenses that apply to the deductible, coinsurance
and out-of-pocket maximums. The gure applies to low income families but looks similar in structure
for other coverage tiers and income levels. The gure completely represents the dierence between
these two plans, since the plans are identical on the co-payments for pharmaceuticals and oce
visits excluded from this chart. Throughout our analysis we assume that (i) premiums are in
pre-tax dollars and (ii) medical expenses are in post-tax dollars.19 After the employee premium
(vertical intercept), as total expenditures increase each employee pays the plan deductible, then the
at coinsurance rate, and nally has zero marginal cost after reaching the out-of-pocket maximum.20
As expected, the chart reveals that, from an ex post perspective, healthy employees shuold have
chosen PPO500 and sick employees PPO250.
The top part of Table 3 shows the pattern of employee choices over time before and after the
menu change. In t 1, 39% of employees enroll in PPO 1, 47% enroll in one of the four HMO
options, and 14% waive coverage. At t0, 46% of employees choose one of the three new PPO
options, with 25% choosing PPO250. 37% choose either of the two remaining HMO plans while
16% waive coverage. The bottom two parts of table 3 study plan choice transitions over time, and
18These characteristics are for in-network purchases. We note that the plans also have slightly dierent out-
of-network characteristics, which we do not present or model. The plans have reasonably similar characteristics
(including out-of-pocket maximums) for out-of-network claims while only 2% of realized claims expenditures apply to
this domain.
19In reality, medical expenses may also be in pre-tax dollars since individuals can pay medical expenses with FSA and
HSA contributions which are pre-tax. However, since approximately 25% of the population enrolles in these accounts,
we believe this is the correct empirical assumption. Moreover, the connected paper Handel et al. (2011) reveals that
consumers should optimally make FSA contributions much less than their expected expenditures. Ultimately, we
could make the tax treatment of medical expenses individual specic since we observe savings account contributions.
In order to convert premiums into pre-tax dollars we multiply premiums by an income-contingent combination of
state and federal marginal tax rates using the NBER TAXSIM data. These adjustments do take into account marital
status and family size but do not take into account spouse's income, for which we have no available data. As a result,
we may understate the marginal tax rate for employees with high-earning spouses.
20In the plans we study, each family member technically has his or her own deductible and out-of-pocket maximum.
On top of these, the family has an aggregate deductible and aggregate out-of-pocket maximum that limits what
can be paid toward the individual deductibles and out-of-pocket maximums respectively. This chart assumes that
expenses are allocated proportionally across family members. The individual and family limits are taken into account
in estimation.
9present clear evidence that the nest of PPO options and nest of HMO options are quite horizontally
dierentiated from one another. An individual who switches plans from a PPO option is much more
likely to choose another PPO option than to choose an HMO option. The middle panel shows
that, of the 2,757 employees enrolled in PPO 1 in year t 1 who also enroll in any plan at t0, only 85
(3%) choose an HMO option at t0. In reverse, despite the expansion of PPO options and reduction
of HMO options, only 15% of employees who chose an HMO option in t 1, and choose any plan
at t0, switch to a PPO option. This is strong evidence that restricting the set of choices to PPO
options should not lead to biased parameters within that population.21
Each plan oered by the rm has a distinct total premium and employee premium contribution in
each year. The total premium is the full cost of insurance while the employee premium contribution
is the amount the employee actually pays after receiving a subsidy from the rm.22 Total premiums
are conditioned on being in one of four coverage tiers.23 The rm conditions PPO subsidies on
an employee's income tier, presumably because of equity considerations.24 Figure 2 illustrates
employee premium contributions in years t0 and t1 for the single and family (spouse plus children)
coverage tiers. There is a noticeable decrease in premiums for PPO500 from t0 to t1 coupled with
an increase in the premium for PPO250. For example, for a family in the top income tier, the price
of PPO500 decreased by $1;560 from t0 to t1 while the price of PPO250 increased by $420.25 There
are also substantial relative premium changes for the other three coverage tiers. As a result of these
large relative employee premium changes, the choice setting in year t1, when most employees had a
default option and switching costs, is quite dierent than that in t0, when the forced re-enrollment
occurred.
3 Preliminary Analysis
We start the analysis by presenting some descriptive evidence of switching costs and adverse selec-
tion. We investigate two dierent model-free tests that suggest switching costs are an important
factor in determining choices over time. In addition, we present a test for adverse selection based
on the data alone. While this section presents strong evidence on the existence and potential im-
pact of these two phenomena, it also highlights that a more in depth modeling exercise is essential
to precisely quantify the magnitudes of these eects and evaluate the impact of a counterfactual
reduction in switching costs. Each analysis uses a sample that diers from our primary sample
because of the specic source of identication involved.
21Einav et al. (2011) nd similar horizontal dierentiation in a similar context.
22For the self-insured PPO options the rm determines the total premium in conjunction with advice from the plan
administrator, who is a large insurer. While in theory these self-insured total premiums could be set in a variety of
dierent ways to reect dierent distributional aims, in our setting total premiums are set in a specic way that is
similar both to other large employers and to what we would expect to arise in certain quasi-private markets such as
health insurance exchanges. This is discussed at length in our pricing analysis in section 6.
23These are (i) single (ii) employee + spouse (iii) employee + child(ren) and (iv) employee + spouse + child(ren).
24The rm gives employees a lump sum subsidy that applies to each potential PPO option. The rm sets a target
of subsidizing 76% of total premium payments for employees.
25This movement is due to total premium adjustment based on t0 average costs for each plan and dependent coverage
tier and reects incremental adverse selection against PPO250.
10New Employees. Our rst test for switching costs studies the behavior of new employees at
the rm over time. New employees are an interesting group to investigate because they have zero
switching costs when they choose a new health plan at the time of their arrival. This is because
(i) they have no health plan default option at the time of arrival and (ii) they were not previously
enrolled in any health plan within the rm.26 Thus, in our setting, employees who are new for year
t0 have zero switching costs in that period and positive switching costs when choosing a plan for
year t1 (this is the same choice structure over time as existing employees, given the menu change).
Moving forward, employees who are new in year t1 have no switching costs at t1 and positive switch-
ing costs thereafter. Given the large price changes for t1 described in the prior section, if the prole
of new employees is similar in each year then large switching costs should imply that the t1 choices
of new enrollees at t0 are dierent than the t1 choices of new enrollees at t1. In that case, the t1
choices of t0 new enrollees should reect the choice environments at both t0 and t1, while the t1
choices of t1 new enrollees should depend on just the t1 environment.
Table 4 compares the choices over time of the cohorts of new enrollees from years t 1, t0, and
t1, with each group composed of slightly more than 1,000 employees. Without switching costs, we
would expect the choices in these three cohorts to be the same at t1, since the table reveals that
they are virtually identical on all other demographic dimensions, including age, gender, income,
FSA enrollment, and health expenditures. Instead, while it is evident that the t0 and t 1 cohorts
make very similar choices with the default option at t1, the new enrollees making active choices in
that year have a very dierent choice prole that reects the price changes for t1. For example,
21% of t0 new enrollees choose PPO250 at t0 while 23% choose PPO500. At t1, 20% of this cohort
choose PPO250 and 26% choose PPO500 only a small change in market share for each plan in the
direction expected given the price changes. The decision prole over time for new enrolles at t 1 is
similar. However, new enrollees at t1 choose PPO250 only 11% of the time, while choosing PPO500
43% of the time. This implies that t0 and t 1 new employees made active choices at t0 and only
adjusted slightly to large price changes at t1, due to high switching costs, while t1 new employees
with no t1 switching costs made active choices at t1, reecting the current prices.
Dominated Plan Choice. Our second test for switching costs leverages a unique situation caused
by the combination of plan characteristics and plan price changes in our setting. As a result of
the large price changes for year t1, PPO250 became strictly dominated for certain combinations of
family size and income (recall, this is how employee premium contributions are determined). Strict
dominance implies that for any possible level and type of total medical expenditures, PPO500 leads
to lower employee expenditures (premium plus out-of-pocket) than PPO250. The bottom panel in
Figure 1 reproduces, for year t1, the t0 analysis of PPO250 and PPO500 health plan characteristics
discussed earlier. The gure studies the relationship between total medical expenditures (employee
26Moreover, because each of the PPO options we study has the exact same network of providers, there is no built-in
advantage for specic plans because of prior coverage. Further, since the PPO options are self-insured, these specic
plans are not oered in the same names and formats at other rms or in the private market.
11and insurer) and employee expenditures (premium plus out-of-pocket) for low income families (em-
ployee plus spouse plus dependent(s)). For this group, the large relative premium change between
these two plans for t1 shifts the relative baseline employee expenditures so much that a low income
family should always enroll in PPO500 at t1 if making an active choice, regardless of beliefs about
future medical expenditures. In fact, the gure illustrates that a low income family that enrolls in
PPO250 at t1 loses at least $1,000 for sure relative to PPO500. Recall that this chart represents all
dimensions of dierentiation between these two plans. At t0, with the active re-enrollment, there
were no dominated plans for any employee. PPO250 is dominated at t1 for four of the other nineteen
potential coverage and income tier combinations. It is important to note that the existence of dom-
inated plans for these select groups was unknown to the rm at t1. Total premiums and employee
subsidies were determined completely separately from the decision on health plan characteristics
made at t0, implying that the rm did not analyze these features in combination with each other
at t1 and t2 as we do here.
Table 5 describes the behavior of the subset of employees who enrolled in PPO250 at t0 and
had that plan become dominated for them in t1 and t2. Of the 1,897 employees who enroll in
PPO250 at t0 and remain with the rm at t1, 559 (29%) had that plan become dominated for
them in t1 (for t2 504 of these remain at the rm). Of these 559 employees, only 61 (11%) switch
plans to an undominated plan at t1 indicating substantial persistence in plan choice that must be
the result of switching costs (under a broad denition) because unobserved preference heterogeneity
cannot rationalize choosing PPO250 at t1. Thus, for these employee groups, in a rational frictionless
environment we would expect 100% of the individuals enrolled in PPO250 at t0 to switch to PPO500
at t1. Of the 61 employees that did switch at t1, the majority (44 (72%)) switch to PPO500 as
expected given an active choice and the large relative price drop of that plan. This pattern remains
similar even at t2 after employees have had more time to communicate with one another: only 126
(25%) of the 504 employees switch by t2, with 103 (82%) switching to PPO500. The table reveals
that the average minimum money lost by employees in these groups from staying in PPO250 is $374
at t1 and $396 at t2.
Table 5 also reveals that employees who switch plans over time are more likely to make other
active decisions. The top part of the table describes linked FSA and dental plan decisions for those
with dominated plans, while the bottom panel describes these choices for people who switch from
any PPO option in the entire population. Conditional on switching from a dominated option at t1,
14.1% of employees also switch dental plan at t1, compared to 4.3% for those who don't switch. For
the entire population and universe of PPO plans (3,170 employees present over multiple years) the
analagous numbers switching dental plan are 14.5% and 3.8%. The table also reveals that employees
who switch plans at t1 are more likely to enroll in an FSA at t1. This is a relevant choice to study
because FSA enrollment is an active choice in each year: employees who do not actively elect to
sign up and list a contribution level are not enrolled. For the entire population in PPO plans, 25%
of those who do not switch sign up for an FSA at t1 while 39% of those who do switch sign up (the
pattern is similar for those with dominated plan options). This correlation could indicate either
12that (i) employees who enroll in and FSA are more generally active consumers or that (ii) when
they make the active choice to switch health plan this causes them to also actively enroll in an FSA.
The analysis also reveals that those who switch are, on average, younger, slightly lower income, and
more likely to be male.
Adverse Selection. Before we present the main econometric framework, we provide evidence that
some adverse selection is present in the data we observe. Table 6 studies the choice and cost behavior
of our primary sample described in the previous section. The top panel shows the level of t 1 claims
for individuals enrolled in each of the PPO options from t 1 to t1. We study t 1 claims for plans
chosen across all three years t 1 to t1 specically to avoid the potential alternative explanation of
moral hazard: in year t 1 all families in this sample were enrolled in PPO 1 implying that t 1
claims are an `apples to apples' measure of health expense risk that is not confounded by moral
hazard. The table reveals that there is selection on medical expenses against the most comprehensive
plan, PPO250. Employees who chose PPO250 had almost double the median and mean of t 1 total
medical claims relative to enrollees in the other two PPO options, in both t0 and t1. Despite the
large price change from t0 to t1, the pattern of selection barely changes over these years. The high
level of selection at t0 reveals that consumers initially chose plans based on health risk, while the
lack of movement in selection over time implies that individuals did not update their selection over
time, even though prices changed signicantly. This suggests that high switching costs likely reduce
adverse selection in t1 relative to what it would have been if everyone had made active plan choices
in that year. This motivates our counterfactual exercise investigating the impact of an information
provision policy that reduces switching costs in the context of a setting with adverse selection.
4 Empirical Framework
The analysis in the previous section provides evidence of both large switching costs and adverse se-
lection without imposing specic choice and cost models. This section presents a model of consumer
choice with three primary components (i) switching costs (ii) family-level risk preferences and (iii)
individual-level ex ante cost projections. We describe the empirical implementation of this model,
which links the choice and medical cost data we observe to these underlying economic choice funda-
mentals. Relative to the earlier analysis, this framework makes it possible to (i) quantify switching
costs and (ii) determine the impact of potential counterfactual information provision policies that re-
duce switching costs. These additional conclusions should be viewed in the context of the structural
assumptions included in the model. We present the supply-side insurance pricing model later in
section 6, together with the analysis of the interaction between switching costs and adverse selection.
Choice Model. We describe the model in two components. First we describe the choice framework
conditional on predicted family-level ex ante medical cost risk. Afterwards, we describe the detailed
cost model that generates these cost distributions.
13The choice model quanties switching costs and risk preferences conditional on the family-plan-
time specic distributions of out-of-pocket health expenditures output by the cost model. Denote
these expense distributions Fkjt(), where k is a family unit, j is one of the three PPO insurance
plans available after the t0 menu change, and t is one of three years from t0 to t2. We assume
that families' beliefs about their out-of-pocket expenditures conform to Fkjt(). Each family has
latent utility Ukjt for each plan in period t. In each time period, each family chooses the plan j
that maximizes Ukjt. We use what Einav et al. (2010a) call a `realized' empirical utility model and





Here, uk() is the v-NM utility index and OOP is a realization of medical expenses from Fkjt().
Wk denotes family-specic wealth. Pkjt is the family-time specic premium contribution for plan
j, which as described earlier depends both on how many dependents are covered and on employee
income.27 1kj;t 1 is an indicator of whether the family was enrolled in plan j in the previous time
period.
We assume that families have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences implying that







Here, k is a family-specic risk preference parameter that is known to the family but unobserved
by the econometrician. We model this as a function of employee demographics XA
k . As  increases,
the curvature of u increases and the decision maker is more risk averse. The CARA specication
implies that the level of absolute risk aversion
 u00()
u0() , which equals , is constant with respect to
the level of x.28
In our primary empirical specication a family's overall level of consumption x conditional on a
draw OOP from Fkjt() depends on multiple factors:
x = Wk   Pkjt   OOP + (XB
kt;Yk)1kj;t 1 + k(Yk)11200 + Hk1250 + kjt(Yk)
 is a switching cost that depends on the observable linked choice and demographic variables XB
kt
and Yk. We describe these in more detail in the estimation section. k is an unobserved family-
specic plan intercept for PPO1200 (11200 is an indicator for j = PPO1200). On average, we expect
k to dier from zero because the health savings account (HSA) option oered exclusively through
PPO1200 horizontally dierentiates this plan from the other two PPO options.29  measures
27We treat premiums as pre-tax payments and out-of-pocket expenditures as after-tax. See our data description in
section 2 for a further discussion.
28This implies that wealth Wk does not impact relative plan utilities. As a result, it drops out in estimation. The
specication for wealth would matter under an alternative framework such as constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
preferences.
29Prior research shows that HSAs can cause signicant hassle costs or, alternatively, provide an extra benet in the
14the intrinsic preference of a high-cost family for PPO250, where high-cost, represented by the
binary variable Hk, is dened as greater than $27,000 (approximately 90th percentile of total cost
distribution) in any of the three years in the sample.30 Finally, kjt represents a family-plan-time
specic idiosyncratic preference shock. Since the plans we study are only dierentiated by nancial
characteristics (apart from the HSA feature) we also follow Einav et al. (2011) and study a robustness
check later with no idiosyncratic preference shock.
There are several assumptions in the choice model that warrant additional discussion. The
model assumes that families know the distribution of their future health expenditure risk and that
this risk conforms to the output of the cost model described in the next section. This assumption
could be incorrect for two potential reasons. First, families may have private information about
their health status that is not captured in the detailed prior claims data. Second, families may
have less information about their projected future health expenditures. As described shortly, the
cost model utilizes a full prole of past claims data in conjunction with sophisticated software that
maps past claims to future expected expenses. Further, the model contains the assumption that
consumers have full knowledge of each health plan's characteristics and incorporate that knowledge
into their decision process. Each of these potential deviations implies a potential bias in the Fkjt
distributions. We present a robustness analysis with our results to show that reasonable sized
deviations from our estimates of Fkjt do not substantially aect the estimated switching costs or
other choice model parameters.
Additionally, switching costs are modeled in a specic way, as an incremental cost paid condi-
tional on actually switching plans (which could arise from a variety of micro-foundations). This
framework implies that, on average, for a family to switch at time t they must prefer an option
other than their default option by $ more than their default. This follows the approach used in
the theoretical literature (see e.g. Farrell and Klemperer (2007)) as well as in the prior empirical
work on switching costs (see e.g. Shum (2004) or Dube et al. (2008)). After we present our results,
we discuss a variety of potential dierent sources of the switching costs we nd (e.g. transac-
tion costs, learning, rational inattention, and inertia) along with several corresponding alternative
specications. While these alternative specications would capture the evident persistence in plan
choice with dierent underlying mechanisms, we argue in the discussion that their implications for
how switching costs interact with adverse selection would not dier substantially from our primary
model.31
Further, our model assumes that consumers are myopic and do not make dynamic decisions
form of an additional retirement account (see e.g. Reed et al. (2009) or McManus et al. (2006)). Further, consumer
uncertainty about how HSAs function could deter choice of the high-deductible health plans linked directly to HSAs.
Though we have data on exact family HSA contributions and linked employer contribution matches for rst-time
enrollees, we choose to incorporate preferences for these benets into the coecient k in lieu of a more detailed
model.
30This latter variable is included to proxy for the fact that almost all families with very high expenses are likely to
choose PPO250 whether it is the best plan for them or not. It is possible that these families assume that, because
they have high expenses, they should always choose the most comprehensive insurance option.
31Also, when we study the welfare consequences of selection resulting from reduced switching costs, we present a
range of welfare calculations that span how switching costs themselves are treated, which links back to these dierent
potential sources.
15whereby current choices would take into account switching costs in future periods. There are sev-
eral arguments to support this approach. First, price changes are not signaled in advance and
change as a function of factors that would be dicult for consumers to model.32 Second, it is
unlikely that most consumers can forecast substantial changes to their health status more than one
year in advance. Third, in this empirical setting consumers make initial choices that make little
sense in the context of a fully dynamic approach. They choose (and stay with) plans at t0 that
provide poor long run value given the time path of prices and health expectations. While it is clear
that dynamics are an important component of choice with switching costs in some settings (e.g.
cable provider or cell phone plan choice), in this setting we believe that incorporating empirically
relevant dynamic aspects would not markedly change the results.
Cost Model. The choice framework presented in the previous section takes the distribution of
future out-of-pocket expenditures for a given family, Fkjt(), as given. This section describes the
empirical model we use to estimate Fkjt(), at a high level. Appendix A delves into this material in
more detail and presents a formal description of the model, its estimation algorithm, and its output
results.
Our approach models health risk and out-of-pocket expenditures at the individual level, and
aggregates the latter measure to the family level since this is the relevant metric for plan choice.
For each individual and choice period, we model the distribution of future health risk at the time
of plan choice using past diagnostic, demographic, and cost information. This ex ante approach
to the cost model ts naturally with the insurance choice model where families make plan choices
under uncertainty. In the majority of prior work investigating individual-level consumer choice and
utilization in health insurance, health risk is either modeled based on (i) demographic variables
such as age and gender and/or (ii) aggregated medical cost data at the individual level, from past
or futures years (Carlin and Town (2009), Einav et al. (2011), and Abaluck and Gruber (2011) are
notable exceptions). While these approaches are useful approximations when detailed medical data
are not available, our model is able to more precisely characterize a given family's information set
at the time of plan choice and can be linked directly to the choice problem.
Our model makes several advances relative to the recent literature that uses micro-level claims
data to quantify individual health risk. First, we use past diagnostic data, in combination with
the Johns Hopkins ACG software package, to predict total future medical expenditures in a so-
phisticated manner. This method incorporates, for example, the duration of conditions and the
implications of multiple simultaneous diagnoses.33 Second, we develop a new parsimonious method
to non-parametrically link expected future health risk to expected future expenditures by com-
32For example, for consumers to understand the evolution of prices they would have to (i) have knowledge of the
pricing model (ii) have knowledge about who will choose which plans and (iii) have knowledge about other employees'
health.
33The program was specically designed to use diagnostic claims data to predict future medical expenditures in
a sophisticated manner. For example, in our model, a 35 year old male who spent $10,000 on a chronic condition
like diabetes in the past year would have higher predicted future health expenses than a 35 year old male who spent
$10,000 in the past year to x time-limited acute condition, such as a broken arm.
16bining the predictive ACG health risk output with observed cost data. Finally, we reconstruct
the mapping from total medical expenditures to health plan out-of-pocket costs using a detailed
breakdown of medical claims and plan characteristics. To this end, we predictively model health
risk across mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories of medical expenditures, including cross-
category correlated risks, and link these categories to plan-specic out-of-pocket cost determinants.
As a result of these advances, our cost model is unique in the literature for its ability to precisely
measure out-of-pocket expense risk. This, in turn, has clear positive implications for the viability
and precision of our choice model parameters and subsequent counterfactual analysis. Appendix A
studies the intricacies of the cost model in more detail.
The cost model assumes that there is no moral hazard (i.e. total family expenditures do not vary
with j) and that there is no family-specic private information. While both of these phenomena
have the potential to be important in health care markets, and are studied extensively in other
research, we believe that these assumptions do not materially impact our results. One primary
reason is that both eects are likely to be quite small relative to the magnitude of switching costs
we estimate, which is generally above a thousand dollars. For private information, we should be less
concerned than prior work because our cost model combines detailed individual-level prior medical
utilization data with sophisticated medical diagnostic software. This makes additional selection
based on private information much more unlikely than it would be in a model that uses coarse de-
mographics or aggregate health information to measure health risk.34 For moral hazard, Chandra
et al. (2010) presents a recent review of the experimental and quasi-experimental literature, where
the price elasticity generally falls in the range -0.1 to -0.4. Recent work by Einav et al. (2011) on
data similar to that use here nds an implied elasticity of -0.14. We perform an in depth robustness
analysis in the next section that incorporates these elasticity estimates into our cost model estimates
to verify that the likely moral hazard impact (i) is small relative to the degree of switching costs
we measure and (ii) does not markedly impact our parameter estimates.35
Identication. Our primary identication concern is to separately identify switching costs from
persistent unobserved preference heterogeneity. Prior studies seeking to quantify switching costs
have been unable to cleanly distinguish between these phenomena primarily because, in their re-
spective settings, they (i) do not observe periods where consumers make identiably 'active' choices
in some periods and identiably 'passive' choices in others and (ii) the products in question are
dierentiated such that persistent consumer preference heterogeneity is a distinct entity for each
product. For a further recent discussion of these issues see, e.g., Dube et al. (2010).
34Cardon and Hendel (2001) nd no evidence of selection based on private information with more coarse data.
Pregnancies, genetic pre-dispositions, and non-coded disease severity are possible examples of private information
that could still exist (technically we could 'back date' pregnancies we observe later in the data to control for this
source). Carlin and Town (2009), whose cost model is done with detailed medical information, also argue that
signicant residual selection is unlikely. Importantly, it is also possible that individuals know less about their risk
prole than we do, since we have a detailed claims record and sophisticated medical software.
35Handel (2010), a prior version of this paper, presents descriptive empirical evidence that the combined eects of
selection on private information and moral hazard are not large in our setting. This is similar in spirit to the work of
Chiappori and Salanie (2000).
17Our setting is ideally suited to overcome these diculties and identify switching costs. First,
the plan menu change and forced re-enrollment at year t0 ensures that we observe each family
in our nal sample making both an 'active' and a 'passive' choice from the same menu of health
plans (same except for year on year price changes). Second, the three PPO plan options we study
have the exact same network of medical providers and cover the same medical services, implying
that dierentiation occurs only through preferences for plan nancial characteristics (here, risk
preferences). Third, since insurance choice here is eectively a choice between dierent nancial
lotteries, our detailed medical data allow us to precisely quantify health risk and the ex ante value
consumers should have for health plans, conditional on the assumption that beliefs conform to
Fkjt and on their risk preferences. Finally, we study three consecutive choices where prices change
substantially over time, which allows us to see consumers making choices in environments where
many should switch absent switching costs. The combined eect of these features implies that (i) we
identify consumer preference heterogeneity based on the choices made in the active choice, forced
re-enrollment period, while (ii) switching costs are identied by analyzing how choices change over
time as the predicted active plan values change. Thus, if switching costs were zero, t1 choices with
the changed plan valuations would reect the preferences identied at t0. Positive switching costs
imply that t1 choices will reect the old choice environment at t0 as well as the new environment
in t1. We can then quantify switching costs by assessing how much value is being foregone at t1
through the continued impact of t0 choices.36
The random coecient  captures an additional preference for PPO1200 resulting from the linked
HSA option.  is identied separately from the family-specic risk aversion parameter, , by lever-
aging the structure of the three available choices.  is identied separately by the choice between
PPO250 and PPO500, which are not horizontally dierentiated in any way, and k is then identied
by examining the choice between the nest of those two plans and PPO1200. These two sources of
preference heterogeneity are then identied separately from switching costs as described above.
Estimation. In our primary specication, we assume that the random coecients k and k
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In the primary specication XA
k contains employee age and income.38 We also investigate a robust-
ness check with log-normally distributed . We denote the mean and variance of k, the random
36Our earlier preliminary analysis reveals that studying the behavior of new employees over time is another avenue
to identify switching costs.
37For normally-distributed , we assume that  is truncated just above zero.
38While age and income do change over time, they vary minimally over the three-year estimation period so we treat
them as constant for a given individual. These represent the individual employee whose family is choosing insurance.
18intercept for PPO1200, as (Yk) and 2
(Yk). These quantities are estimated conditional on the
binary family status indicator Yk, with the two categories of (i) single and (ii) family covering
dependents.39
Switching costs, (XB




kt;Yk) = 0 + 1XB
kt + 2Yk
XB
kt contains potentially time-varying variables that switching costs may depend on, including in-
come and whether or not (i) the family enrolls in a exible spending account (FSA) (ii) the employee
has a quantitative background (iii) the employee is a manager within the rm (iv) a family member
has a chronic medical condition (v) the family has a large change in expected expenditures from
one year to the next or (vi) the family switches away from PPO1200. Note here that many of the
XB
kt and Yk conditioning variables are binary, implying the linearity assumption is not restrictive
for these variables.
Finally, we assume that the probit family-plan-time specic error terms kjt are distributed
i.i.d. for each j with mean j(Yk) and variance j(Yk). Since Yk is a binary variable we make no
additional assumptions on how these means and variances relate to Yk. We normalize the value of
250, the preference shock for PPO250, to zero for each realization of Yk, and estimate the preference
shock means and variances for the other two plans relative to PPO250. 40 Since the set of PPO
plans we study can be compared purely based on nancial characteristics (conditional on the already
modeled HSA option), we follow Einav et al. (2011) and study a robust specication without kjt.
We estimate the choice model using a random coecients probit simulated maximum likelihood
approach similar to that summarized in Train (2009). The simulated maximum likelihood estimation
approach has the minimum variance for a consistent and asymptotically normal estimator, while not
being too computationally burdensome in our framework. Since we use panel data, the likelihood
function at the family level is computed for a sequence of choices from t0 to t2, since switching costs
imply that the likelihood of a choice made in the current period depends on the choice made in the
previous period. The maximum likelihood estimator selects the parameter values that maximize the
similarity between actual choices and choices simulated with the parameters. Since the estimation
algorithm is similar to a standard approach, we describe the remainder of the details in Appendix
B.
5 Choice Model Results
Table 7 presents the results of the choice model. Column 1 presents the results from the primary
specication while columns 2-5 present the results from four robustness analyses.
39Yk is taken as time-invariant and relates to the maximum of dependents covered between t0 and t2.
40Since the model is a 'realized' utility model in dollar units, we don't need an additional scale normalization for
the estimated variances.
19In the primary specication, the switching cost intercept 0 is large in magnitude with values
of $1;729 for single employees and of $2;480 for employees who cover at least one dependent. An
employee who enrolls in a exible spending account (FSA) is estimated to have $551 lower switching
costs than one who does not. The results show a small and negative relationship between income
tier and switching costs. The coecient describing the relationship between switching costs and
being a manager (higher-level / white-collar employee) is positive but statistically insignicant
while the coecient linking switching costs to quantitative aptitude is near zero and insignicant.
Employees (or their dependents) who have chronic medical conditions or a salient change in medical
expenditures are estimated to have slightly higher switching costs than those without. This goes
against our hypothesis that these employees would have lower switching costs because they pay
closer attention to their insurance product. However, these employees are predominantly high-cost
consumers who also may be unwilling to switch to a plan that they have no experience using.41
Since our estimates link switching costs to multiple dimensions of observable heterogeneity, we
also present the population mean and variance of switching costs implied by our estimates. The
mean total switching cost per employee is $2;032 with a population standard deviation of $446.
This implies that, on average, when an employee has a previously chosen plan as their current
default option, he forgoes up to $2;032 in expected savings from an alternative option to remain
in the default plan. These results can also be viewed in light of the potential underlying sources of
switching costs discussed in section 7. For example, note that the base of family switching costs is
approximately 1.4 times larger than the base of individual switching costs despite having roughly
3 times the money at stake in the health insurance decision. This suggests that a pure inattention
model with probabilistic re-optimization is not the primary basis for the estimated switching costs,
since in this case switching costs would reect the entire change in money at stake.
As the CARA coecients presented in table 7 are dicult to interpret, we follow Cohen and
Einav (2007) and analyze these estimates in a more intuitive manner in table 8. The table presents
the value X that would make an individual with our estimated risk preferences indierent between
inaction and accepting a gamble with a 50% chance of gaining $100 and a 50% chance of losing $X.42
Thus, a risk neutral individual will have X = $100 while an innitely risk averse individual will
have X close to zero. The top section of the table presents the results for the primary specication.
X is $94:6 for the mean / median individual, implying a moderate amount of risk aversion relative
to other results in the literature, which we present at the bottom of the table. X is $92:2 for the
95th percentile of  and $91:8 for the 99th, so preferences don't exhibit substantial heterogeneity
in the context of the litereature. Finally, our estimates in Table 7 reveal that the mean of the
distribution of  is slightly increasing in age and income, though neither eect has a large impact
on the interpretations in table 8.43
41This kind of learning is not explicitly modeled and is embedded in the switching cost estimates. Farrell and
Klemperer (2007) cite learning about alternative products as one potential underlying source of switching costs.
42These gures are computed for an individual with mean age and mean income.
43The positive relationship between income and risk aversion may reect that (i) higher income employees have
a heuristic that makes them more likely to select higher coverage and (ii) we don't estimate heterogeneity in plan
intercepts with respect to income.
20The results in table 7 also indicate that, above and beyond out-of-pocket expenditure risk, there
is a strong distaste for PPO1200. The distribution of the random coecient  for single employees
has a mean of $   2;912 with a standard deviation of $843. Moreover, this coecient internalizes
the HSA match for rst time enrollees of up to $1,200, implying that the actual distaste for this
plan is larger than the estimate indicates. This plan was, if anything, marketed more strongly to
employees than the other options. The primary explanations for this distaste are (i) hassle costs
from using the health savings account (ii) uncertainty surrounding how to use the health savings
account for medical expenses and (iii) uncertainty about the retirement benets of health savings
accounts. We believe that decomposing the sources of this distaste is an interesting topic for future
work.
Robustness. Table 7 presents results from four robustness specications that provide insight into
the sensitivity of the primary estimates with respect to core underlying assumptions. Column 2
studies a basic specication that estimates the model without conditioning the switching cost 
and risk preference  on observable demographics and linked choices. This sheds light on how the
switching cost and risk preference estimates change when estimating these values for the whole
population rather than as a function of observable heterogeneity.
Column 3 studies the impact of our cost model assumption that there is no moral hazard. To
do this we necessarily make some simplifying assumptions: for a full structural treatment of moral
hazard in health insurance utilization see, e.g., Cardon and Hendel (2001), Einav et al. (2011) or
Kowalski (2011). We implement the moral hazard robustness check by adjusting the output of the
cost model to reect lower total utilization in the less comprehensive plans (and vice-versa). The
intent is to show that, even when including price elasticities that are quite large relative to those
found in the literature, the model output for switching costs and risk preferences does not change
substantially. This analysis also sheds light on whether deviations in beliefs from Fkjt, e.g. from
private information, have a marked impact on our results. Since this is a non-trivial exercise, we
present the details of this analysis in Appendix C.
Column 4 studies the case where risk preference heterogeneity is log-normally distributed in order
to determine sensitivity with respect to the normality assumption on . Column 5 follows Einav
et al. (2011) and investigates the choice model without the family-plan-time specic idiosyncratic
preference shock kjt. As in their setting, there is a theoretical rationale for excluding this part of
the model: the plans we study are vertically dierentiated by nancial characteristics but have no
horizontal dierentiation (except for HSA account linked to PPO1200 already modeled through ).
This robustness check allows us to assess the sensitivity of our parameters to the presence of  and
gain more insight into the empirical impact of this theoretically motivated restriction.44
Overall, the results from these alternative specications suggest that our key parameter estimates
and, consequently, the results from our information provision counterfactual analysis are robust to
changes of the choice model's underlying assumptions. The population mean across Columns 2-5
44In our setting,  for PPO1200 could be interpreted as time-varying preferences for the HSA option. For the other
plans it could be a reduced form representation of deviation from the health expense expectations assumption.
21ranges from $1886 to $2087 while the population variance ranges from $286 to $731. The specic
coecients for all model components are very similar to those in the primary specication for three
of the four robustness analyses. The risk-preference robustness check (column 4) estimates dier
somewhat: the mean level of switching costs is similar to that in the other specications but the
standard deviation is twice as large. This reects the diering estimated coecients on observable
heterogeneity in this specication, which are larger in magnitude than our primary results. These
dierences likely arise from the choice implications of the wider tails of risk preferences inherent
to the log-normal assumption, which we illustrate in the bottom section of table 8. We now turn
to the issue of how reductions to the large switching costs that we nd impact consumer choices,
adverse selection, and welfare in our setting.
6 Information Provision: Switching Costs and Adverse Selection
In this study, consumers are enrolled in sub-optimal health plans over time (from the individual
perspective) because of switching costs. After initially making informed decisions, consumers don't
perfectly adjust their choices over time in response to changes to the market environment (e.g.
prices) and their own health status. In this section, we use the results from the structural consumer
choice analysis together with a model of information provision and health plan pricing to investigate
the impact of a counterfactual policy that improves consumer choices by reducing switching costs.
In each period, consumers are provided information that reduces their level of switching costs to
some amount between their estimated switching cost level and zero. We study the welfare conse-
quences of reduced switching costs in both (i) a 'naive' setting where the price of insurance does
not change as a consequence of incremental selection and (ii) a 'sophisticated' setting where plan
prices change to reect the new risk prole of employees enrolled in the dierent options. While
we describe this exercise as an information provision intervention, the following analysis can be
applied to any policy or market change that leads to a reduction in switching costs. In section 7,
we discuss specic information provision policies that have been proposed in the Aordable Care
Act and employer provided insurance market, in the context of the underlying sources of switching
costs that they impact.
Model of Information Provision and Plan Pricing. Formally, we model the impact of infor-
mation provision by assuming that the improved consumer knowledge reduces switching costs to a
fraction Z of the family-specic estimate k. Here, Z decreases as the counterfactual information
provision policy becomes more eective. In the limit, as Z goes to zero, one could imagine a policy
that leads to full re-optimization in each choice period.45 To reect the fact that only switching
costs, plan prices, and past plan choices change in the counterfactual exercise from the current
period choice perspective (health plan characteristics and health status are as observed) we restate
the expected utility of family k for plan j at time t as an explicit function of these changing choice
45We assume that the information provision policy is costless, though the analysis could be performed where the






We omit the dependence of utility on the other choice factors modeled in section 4 for notational
simplicity, though we use continue to use all of these factors in the expected utility calculations.
Consumers choose the plan j that maximizes their expected utility in each period t, subject to the
preference estimates from our primary specication and the updated choice environment resulting
from information provision. With endogenous plan pricing, these choices determine health plan
costs, which in turn determine health plan premiums. As a result, the plan a family enrolls in in
the environment with reduced switching costs depends both on the direct eect on their choice as
well as the indirect eect that this reduction has on premiums resulting from the new prole of
choices in the entire population. In theory, this collective externality on premiums from reduced
switching costs could cause incremental advantageous selection, where the relative price of more
comprehensive insurance decreases, or adverse selection, where this relative price increases.
In order to determine the impact of this externality in the information provision counterfactual,
we model insurance plan pricing. Our model follows the pricing rule used by the rm during the
time period studied, and is similar to plan pricing models used in the literature on the welfare
consequences of adverse selection across a variety of contexts (see e.g. Cutler and Reber (1998)
or Einav et al. (2010b) or Carlin and Town (2009)). The rm we study was self-insured for the
PPO options in the choice model, implying that it has full control over the total premiums for each
plan option as well as the subsidies employees receive toward those premiums. The total premium
paid (by employer and employee), TP
y
jt, for each plan and year was set as the average plan cost for
that plan's previous year's enrollees, plus an administrative markup, conditional on the dependent


















j;t 1 refers to the population of families in plan j at time t 1 in coverage tier y. PPkj;t 1
is the total plan paid in medical expenditures conditional on y and j at t 1. This total premium is
the amount an employee in dependent category y enrolling in plan j would have to pay each year if
they received no health insurance subsidy from the rm. In our setting, the rm subsidizes insurance
for each employee as a percentage of the total PPO1200 premium conditional on the family's income
tier, Ik.47 Denote this subsidy S(Ik). Building on these elements, the family-plan-time specic






46There are four coverage tiers (i) single (ii) employee plus spouse (iii) employee + child(ren) and (iv) employee
plus spouse plus child(ren).
47The subsidy rates for the ve income tiers ordered from poorest to wealthiest are .97, .93, .83, .71, and .64.
23For PPO1200, Pkjt is a xed percentage of the total premium. For the other two PPO plan
options employees pay the full marginal cost of the total premium relative to PPO1200. Finally,
since Pkjt depends on past cost information, we assume that Pkj;t0 equals the actual employee
premium contributions set by the rm at t0.48 In section 7 we provide further motivation for our in-
surance pricing model in the context of the literature and discuss several alternative market models.
Welfare. We analyze welfare using a certainty equivalent approach that equates the expected
utility for each potential health plan option, Ukjt, with a certain monetary payment Q. Formally,






k )(W Qkjt) = Ukjt(Pkjt;Zk;1kj;t 1)
The certainty equivalent loss Qkjt makes a consumer indierent between losing Qkjt for sure and
obtaining the risky payo from enrolling in j. This welfare measure translates the expected utilities,
which are subject to cardinal transformations, into values that can be interpreted in monetary terms.
An important issue in our setting is whether or not switching costs themselves should be in-
corporated into the welfare calculation as they change according to Z in the information provision
exercise. It is natural to think that certain potential sources of our estimated switching costs should
be excluded from the welfare calculation, while others imply a tangible social cost that should be
incorporated. Since our empirical choice framework does not distinguish between the potential
switching cost sources discussed in section 7, we study a range of welfare results spanning the case
where switching costs aren't incorporated into the welfare calculation at all to the case where they
are fully incorporated. Formally, we calculate the certainty equivalent loss as a function of the










As  decreases from 1 to 0, the proportion of switching costs factored into the certainty equivalent
for a non-incumbent plan decreases to Zk and that potential switch becomes more attractive
from a welfare perspective. Within this context, we investigate the welfare consequences of each
information provision policy, described by Z, for  between 0 and 1.49 To our knowledge, this
is the rst empirical structural analysis that accounts for this range of welfare possibilities for a
phenomenon like switching costs.
Conditional on , the family welfare impact of an information provision policy leading to a
switching cost reduction to Zk is:
48Presumably these contributions were set with the expectation that total premiums for each plan would equal
average cost, though maintaining this stance is not necessary to assess the impact of the information intervention in
the environment studied unless the rm would have adjusted Pkj;t0 together with the policies determining Z.
49This analysis relates to the welfare foundations laid out in Bernheim and Rangel (2009), who study a framework
where choices can be close to, but not completely reect, fundamental underlying preferences. Our approach is





This is the dierence in certainty equivalents, for a given family, between the health plan chosen
after the policy intervention, denoted jz, and the choice j made in the benchmark model, net of any
additional switching costs incorporated.50 Since total premiums relate directly to average costs, the
total welfare change diers from the consumer welfare change only if the sum of employee contri-
butions Pkjt diers under policy Z than in the benchmark model. This will happen mechanically
in our model since the market environment and consumer choices change as a result of information
provision and the subsidy rule is not tied directly to an overall proportion of kPkjt. Given this,











The distinction between consumers surplus and total surplus here depends only on this change in
aggregate premiums paid and is not a substantive issue. If the employee contributions were required
to add up to a portion of total premiums conditional on Z then consumer welfare is equivalent to
overall welfare in our model.51 Since aggregate premiums do not change as the enrollment prole
does, the welfare change here results primarily from impact of risk preferences as consumers are
matched to dierent plans. We report this welfare change as a percentage by dividing TSZ
t by
three dierent metrics from the benchmark setting (i) the average employee premium paid in year
t (ii) the average sum of premium and out-of-pocket medical expenditures at t and (iii) the average
total certainty equivalent loss of the plans consumers enroll in at t. These calculations give a sense of
the welfare consequences of the information intervention relative to important quantities: for a fur-
ther discussion of potential welfare benchmarks in health insurance markets see Einav et al. (2010b).
Results: No Plan Re-Pricing. Before we investigate the interaction between a reduction in
switching costs and adverse selection, we analyze the 'naive' case where information provision oc-
curs but health plan premiums are held xed as observed in the data. Consumers may switch to a
new health plan as a result of lower switching costs, but this selection does not feed back into prices
on the basis of new enrollee cost proles. In this context, the policy intervention can only increase
welfare since prices are by denition unchanged and the policy helps consumers make weakly better
decisions relative to the benchmark case. This analysis presents a direct comparison to prior work
that studies the impact of reduced choice frictions where (i) consumer choices don't impact rm
costs or (ii) the feedback between choices and costs/prices is ignored.52
50Note that this family-level welfare impact will generically be non-zero since premiums will adjust as the result of
the intervention Z even if a given family's choice does not.
51In this case, total premiums could be held constant moving to policy Z by taking the per-person dierence in
total premiums across two environments and adding or subtracting this term from P
Z
kjt.
52For prior work of this kind on insurance markets see e.g. Kling et al. (2011) and Abaluck and Gruber (2011). More
broadly, there is some work studying the equilibrium consequences of consumer choice inadequacy in the industrial
organization literature, though these analyses do not study a context where choices directly impact costs as they do
25Figure 3 presents market share and average cost results for the partial equilibrium information
provision simulation as a function of Z. Results are presented for years t1 and t2 for switching cost
levels ranging from 0 to . The top panel reveals that, as Z decreases towards 0, consumers adjust
more readily to the observed price changes and are more likely to enroll in PPO500 (recall relative
prices for PPO250 went up in t1). For the case where Z = 1
4, and information provision removes
most but not all switching costs, 913 employees enroll in PPO500 at t1, a 44% increase over the
benchmark model with full switching costs where 639 consumers choose that plan. For the cases
of Z = 1
2 and Z = 0, t1 enrollments in PPO500 are 780 (21% increase) and 1;052 (65% increase)
respectively. Moving forward to t2, for Z = 1
4, there are 1;010 enrollees in PPO500 relative to 702
in the benchmark case (a 44% increase). Almost all of the switchers towards PPO500 would have
continued enrollment in PPO250 in the benchmark case. The gure also reveals that switching to and
from PPO1200 as the result of information provision is limited, due to the horizontal dierentiation
 resulting from the health savings account and linked features. The lower panel in gure 3 reveals
that these dierent enrollment patterns over time imply dierent plan average costs. For the family
coverage tier average costs for PPO250 increase relative to those in PPO500 as enrollment in the
former declines relative to the latter, implying that the people who switch out of PPO250 into
PPO500 are healthier than those who do not switch. This result is similar for other coverage tiers
and suggests that, in the primary analysis with endogenous plan re-pricing, PPO250 premiums will
become more expensive, potentially leading to even more selection against that plan in subsequent
periods.
Table 9 presents the welfare impact of moving from the benchmark environment with full switch-
ing costs to the case where Z = 1
4. At t2, the mean per employee certainty equivalent increase is
$114. For those who switch plans in the counterfactual environment relative to the benchmark
case, the mean benet is $196 (for those who do not switch, the change is zero by denition).
The policy intervention improves welfare by 5:8% of total employee premium contributions, and
by 2:5% relative to the total employee spending benchmark (the table also reports the % changes
for the certainty equivalent at stake benchmark). The analagous percentage changes for those who
switch plans are 10:0% and 4:4% relative to these respective metrics. These numbers are similar
to, but slightly larger tham, the impact of the information intervention during t1. The positive
welfare impact of improved individual-level choices in the environment without plan re-pricing is
similar to prior results in the empirical literature on choice inadequacy, but stands in stark contrast
to the negative welfare results in our analysis with endogenous plan re-pricing, which we now turn to.
Results: Endogenous Plan Re-Pricing. With endogenous plan re-pricing, premiums change
as consumers switch plans due to the policy intervention. It is possible that even a small change to
the prole of choices without plan re-pricing will map to a large change in premiums and choices
with endogenous re-pricing. A small enrollment change under no re-pricing could imply a change in
premiums that leads to further incremental switching, in turn leading to further enrollment changes
when adverse selection is a concern (see e.g. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) or Ellison (2006)).
26and an unraveling process that continues until it reaches a new xed point between enrollment
and premiums. The link between choices, costs, and prices could lead to more or less adverse
selection over time in the presence of reduced switching costs. For example, in our empirical model
switching costs are estimated conditional on multiple dimensions of observable heterogeneity that
are correlated with health status in a specic manner. In the spirit of Einav et al. (2010c) and
Cutler et al. (2008), if estimated switching costs are suciently negatively correlated with expected
expenditures then healthy people who initially sign up for PPO250 would be less likely to switch
from that plan over time conditional on the value of switching, leading to reduced adverse selection.
More broadly, the nature of incremental selection depends on both the stochastic process governing
health status and the choice environment when consumers make initial choices, in the absence of
switching costs. The results from our analysis with no plan re-pricing suggest that we will nd
increased adverse selection as a result of reduced switching costs since, across the range of Z, we
nd that the average cost dierence between PPO250 and PPO500 increases.
For each Z, we study the evolution of choices, prices, and welfare from year t0 to t6, four years
beyond the end of our data.53 The top panel in Figure 4 presents the time path of plan market shares
for PPO250 and PPO500 and the two cases of (i) Z = 1 (full switching costs) and (ii) Z = 1
4. The
impact of the policy intervention on the market share of PPO250 relative to PPO500 is noticeable:
reduced switching costs decrease t6 enrollment in PPO250 from 744 to 385 and increase enrollment in
PPO500 from 647 to 1134. This indicates that the improved choices over time substantially increase
incremental adverse selection, to the point where PPO250 is almost eliminated from the market due
to high premiums caused by the sick prole of enrollees (this kind of insurance market unraveling is
known as a 'death spiral', see e.g. Cutler and Reber (1998)). This enrollment gap is also large for
years t1 to t5. Relative to the no re-pricing case, in t1 and t2 PPO250 has much lower enrollment
after the policy intervention, revealing the large impact of endogenous re-pricing. The bottom panel
of Figure 4 reveals the substantial and increasing family tier average cost dierential between these
two plans over time. The average cost (and total premium) of PPO250 increases relative to PPO500
under information provision for all years from t1 to t6, with a maximum relative change of $4;619.
This pattern is similar for the other coverage tiers and indicates signicant incremental adverse
selection as a result of reduced switching costs. Enrollment in PPO1200 does not change markedly
relative to the benchmark case, due to the substantial horizontal dierentiation.
Figure 5 shows market shares and average costs for PP0500 and PPO250 in years t1, t2, and t4
as a function of Z. We report results for values of Z equal to 0,.25,.5, and 1. It is clear from the
top panel that as Z decreases from 1, and information provision becomes more eective, enrollment
in PPO250 declines at the expense of enrollment in PPO500. The bottom panel reveals that as
Z decreases and enrollment increases, the relative average costs (and total premiums) of PPO250
increase, implying that as information provision becomes more eective we nd higher incremental
adverse selection.
53From t3 to t6 we assume that the demographics and health status for the sample are the same as observed in t2.
This implies that the analysis for these time periods reects the long-run impact of reduced switching costs on prices
and selection.
27Table 10 presents a detailed analysis of the welfare impact of an information provision policy that
reduces switching costs from  to :25 (Z = :25). For this table and table 11, we assume that  = 0,
implying that the reduction in switching costs from the policy intervention does not enter the welfare
calculation.54 We calculate this impact for the population overall as well as for select groups of
interest. For the entire population, the information provision policy to improve choices has a negative
welfare impact in each year and overall. The mean per employee per year certainty equivalent welfare
loss is $115, implying an average per person welfare loss of $690 over the time period studied. This
translates to a 7:7% loss using average employee premium contributions as a benchmark. Table
10 also reveals that the information provision policy has substantial distributional consequences.
Employees who switch plans as a result of the intervention have an average welfare gain of $186 per
employee per year (12:4% of total premiums). Those who do not switch plans experience a mean
per employee per year loss of $442 ( 29:4%). The welfare impact on employees that do not switch
plans comes entirely from the changes to their plan prices resulting from incremental selection
from those that do switch. This is interesting to contrast with the results under no re-pricing,
where non-switchers have zero welfare loss by necessity.55 The table also shows that high-expense
employees experience a small welfare improvement from the intervention equivalent to $62 (4:1%)
per employee per year versus a $137 ( 9:1%) per employee per year loss for all other employees.56
Single employees lose an average of $319 ( 21:3%) per employee per year versus a $61 gain for
employees with at least one dependent. Finally, lower income employees (making less than $72;000
per year) lose an average of $200 per employee per year as a result of the intervention, versus no
change in welfare for high income employees. While these specic group eects may dier in other
contexts, it is likely that any policy that substantially improves (or hinders) choices in similar health
insurance markets will have non-trivial distributional consequences.
Table 11 broadens the welfare analysis to include a spectrum of information provision counter-
factuals, including the cases of Z equal to 0:75, 0:5, 0:25, and 0. We also study the welfare loss
of adverse selection in our observed setting relative to the conditional rst-best outcome. In our
setting, the welfare loss comes from (i) having risk-averse individuals enrolled in less comprehensive
insurance and (when  > 0) (ii) switching costs. Thus, the rst-best conditional on the set of
health plans oered is to have all employees enrolled in PPO250 in every time period. The table
presents the average per employee per year certainty equivalent change for each of these counter-
factual scenarios relative to the baseline (the analogous gures to the last column in Table 10),
with percentage changes reported relative to average employee premium contributions. The welfare
loss from adverse selection in the baseline relative to the rst best is $123 ( 8:2%) per employee
per year.57 This welfare loss becomes worse as Z declines from 1 to 0:25. For Z equal to :75, :5,
54Thus, the welfare impact here reects purely the welfare dierence from the choices made and does not incorporate
the assumed reduction in switching costs as a tangible cost.
55Here, total premiums increase in both PPO250 and PPO500, implying that every family that remains in the same
plan loses money relative to case with full switching costs.
56High-expense is dened as spending more than $15;000 for a single employee, $25;000 for a family of size two,
and $32;000 for a larger family (this covers approximately 10% of the population).
57This can be compared directly to the numbers found in the literature on the welfare consequences of adverse
selection. Cutler and Reber (1998) nd that the welfare loss from adverse selection in their environment is between
28and :25 the incremental losses relative to our baseline are $41 ( 2:7%), $73 ( 4:9%), and $115
( 7:7%) respectively. For Z = 0, this loss is $107 ( 7:1%),a slightly smaller loss than that when
Z = 0:25.58. The table also presents the welfare impact for the select population groups studied
in table 10. Employees who switch plans as a result of the intervention have a substantial welfare
gain equivalent to $1;017 (68%) per person when Z = 0:75, which decreases to a $118 (7:9%) when
Z = 0. For those who don't switch, the welfare loss ranges from $249 ( 16:6%) in the former case
to $382 ( 25:4%) in the latter. The results for employee groups based on coverage status, income
status, and expense level are similar in direction to those presented for Z = :25 in table 10, though
there is some variation in their relative magnitudes. The distributional impacts of moving to the
rst-best are substantial, and reect the pooling of the entire population into PP0250. The sick and
high-income employees who are more likely to be in this plan in the baseline benet from pooling
at the expense of the healthier low-income employees more likely to be moved into this plan.
Table 12 expands the analysis further to allow for the possibility that some proportion of es-
timated, and subsequently reduced, switching costs be incorporated into the welfare calculation.
The top panel studies the prole of switching costs incurred under dierent Z over time. The mean
per employee per year switching costs incurred is $185 for the baseline case and $188 for the case
where Z = 0:75 (note that this calculation covers the entire population, not switchers only). This
means that the product of the number of switchers and switching costs is slightly larger as switching
costs are reduced from the baseline, implying that the increased number of switchers makes up for
the decrease in switching costs per switcher. For Z = :5 and Z = :25 the mean per employee per
year incurred switching costs are $142 and $83 respectively, while Z = 0 by denition implies no
switching costs. These patterns are similar for each individual year, though the overall level of
switching costs incurred is higher in t1 and t2 than in later years as the market moves towards a
steady state.
The bottom panel of table 12 presents the overall welfare impact of the range of policies described
by Z, as a function of , together with the extent to which switching costs impact this calculation
in each case.59 Results are presented for  equal to 0 (no switching costs in welfare calculation),
.25, .5, and 1 (all included). The results for  = 0 restate the results from table 11. When  = 0:25,
the welfare change caused by the policy intervention is $90 (-6:0%) for Z = 0:25, compared to the
$115 loss when  = 0. In the extreme case when all switching costs count in the welfare calculation
( = 1), the Z = 0:25 policy leads to a $13 ( 0:9%) loss. More broadly, the table reveals that the
impact of including a higher proportion of switching costs in the welfare calculation is larger the
more switching costs are reduced by the intervention. For example, the welfare impact of Z = 0:75
2-4% of total baseline spending. In our setting, when renormalized by this metric, we nd a welfare loss of -2.9%,
right in the middle of this range. Recent work by Carlin and Town (2009), Bundorf et al. (2010), Einav et al. (2010b),
and Einav et al. (2011) nd results that are in this ballpark in a variety of empirical settings.
58This non-monotonicity of the welfare loss in Z near 0 arises because, when switching costs are entirely removed,
premiums and enrollment oscillate towards a stable equilibrium rather than move monotonically to that steady state.
This results from the specic features of the distribution of health risk and evolution of prices and is characteristic of
the intricacies of equilibria with adverse selection (see e.g. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976))
59Welfare relevant switching costs equal  multiplied by the average per employee per year population switching
costs incurred for each policy intervention (the bottom row in the top panel).
29relative to the baseline is close to constant as a function of , while the more eective Z = 0:25
intervention has a wider range of potential welfare impacts as a function of . Importantly, the
welfare impact of information provision is negative across the range of  for all Z except Z = 0.
This suggests that regardless of the stance taken on what the sources of the estimated switching
costs are, the counterfactual reduction in switching costs will lead to increased adverse selection
and lower welfare in general.60
7 Discussion
Sources of Switching Costs. In the empirical framework switching costs enter the expected
utility function as a xed monetary preference for the incumbent plan relative to alternative op-
tions. However, it is likely that the substantial switching costs documented in this work arise from
a variety of sources tied to dierent underlying microeconomic fundamentals. If alternative sources
of switching costs are prominent this could have implications for (i) the choice model estimates (ii)
what policies are actually eective in reducing switching costs and (iii) how switching costs interact
with adverse selection. We now present some prominent alternative explanations and argue that
dierentiating between these explanations would not markedly changes our results on the impact
of switching costs and their interaction with adverse selection.
Transactions Costs. Transactions costs are the most commonly cited potential source of switching
costs in the theoretical and empirical literatures (see e.g. Farrell and Klemperer (2007) for the for-
mer and Shum (2004) or Dube et al. (2010) for the latter). Our choice framework follows the prior
empirical literature and models switching costs as if they arise completely from transaction costs.
In our setting, transaction costs could result from, e.g., the time and hassle costs of (i) researching
alternative health plan options or (ii) actually switching plans. It is clear that transaction costs
have the potential to be quite large in our setting. Health plans are complicated objects to choose
between, often described in long documents with substantial legalese, while the process of actually
making a choice can require multiple non-trivial and costly actions.
Learning Costs. Learning costs are another potential source of switching costs (see e.g. Klem-
perer (1995)). Learning costs occur when, after purchasing a product, a consumer has to put in
time and eort to learn about how to use its various features. Learning costs imply that once you
have purchased a product, you don't incur this source of switching costs when moving back to that
product. Here, this is likely only a small component of the switching costs we estimate since the
three PPO plan options have the exact same network of providers and the only real product-specic
learning that could occur relates to the Health Savings Account (HSA) option in PPO1200.
60For Z = 0, the welfare impact of the intervention is negative for  of 0,0:25, and 0:5 but positive for  = 1.
This means when all switching costs are a tangible welfare component and switching costs are entirely eradicated, the
information intervention increases welfare. In this case, there is still increased adverse selection from the intervention,
but the positive welfare eect from the substantial reduction in switching costs paid outweights the negative impact
of adverse selection.
30Product Compatibility. Learning costs and product compatibility, another potential source of switch-
ing costs, would both be important issues in cases where consumers had to switch medical providers
and disrupt continuity of care when switching health plan. Compatibility costs occur when product-
specic investments are made that increase the value of a product relative to an otherwise similar
product (see e.g. Klemperer (1995)). In our setting, since the PPO plan options we study have the
same network of providers, there are no compatibility issues because relationship-specic invest-
ments can be transferred seamlessly across these choices. This implies that the switching costs we
estimate are a lower bound relative to switching costs in a broader plan setting where a consumer
has to switch providers to switch health plan. We believe that switching costs from provider lock-in
are an important issue to study in future work.
Fixed Re-Optimization Cost. This model and prior work studies switching costs in an environ-
ment where the models assume that consumers have perfect knowledge of product characteristics.
In the transaction costs section above, we noted the research costs are a potentially important
source of switching costs, implying that there may be imperfect knowledge of plan options. In this
case, a more sophisticated model could treat the decision process as a two-stage process where (i)
consumers pay some transaction cost to re-optimize and (ii) change plans after acquiring informa-
tion. This is dierent than the transaction costs explanation above because ex ante beliefs about
product characteristics are important to the decision to re-optimize: a consumer could have small
transaction / re-optimization costs but beliefs that they have little to gain from acquiring informa-
tion. In our setting, where prices changed substantially from t0 to t1, consumer beliefs may have
been centered around status-quo prices, implying that a small transaction cost could dissuade them
from re-optimizing and in turn lead to a large switching cost estimate. In this case, our switching
cost estimates can be interpreted as money that consumers leave on the table as a result of this
decision process. Note that since there is low switching for t2 as well, under this model consumers
in our environment also do not learn about the potential to gain a lot of money from switching over
time, implying incorrect beliefs can be quite persistent.
Inertial & Psychological Costs. There is a substantial empirical literature studying consumer inertia
and psychological switching costs (see e.g. Madrian and Shea (2001), Samuelson and Zeckhauser
(1988), or Thaler and Sunstein (2008)). This explanation is also related to the empirical literature
on brand loyalty in marketing (see e.g. Dube et al. (2009)). Following Klemperer (1995) we dene
this source of switching costs as those that arise above and beyond any clearly identiable rational
phenomenon.61
These dierent potential sources could have dierent implications for how switching costs inter-
61The empirical literature on inertia overlaps with the literature on switching costs in that some of the phenomena
we describe in this discussion are also sources of inertia in the literature. Thus, our denition of inertia here is narrower
than that in the literature, while our denition of switching costs contains all sources of inertia in the literature.
31act with adverse selection. For example, if inertia or the xed re-optimization cost are prominent
sources then people who switch on the margin would come more diusely from the distribution of the
marginal benet from switching plan. If transaction costs are prominent, then those with the most
to gain from switching will be more likely to do so than others who benet, but by less. However, in
either case, as switching costs are reduced in the counterfactual exercise we would be moving from
the environment we observe with substantial choice persistence to one where consumers are making
almost entirely active choices. The environment with reduced switching costs would have similarly
increased adverse selection in either scenario, leading to similar welfare implications for the policy
intervention. Additionally, it is unlikely that the model of switching costs seriously biases other
parameter estimates (such as risk preferences) because those parameters are identied separately
from choice persistence (in any form) based on choices made in the active choice year at t0, which
will not change regardless of the specic model of switching costs.
Of course, these arguments do not determine whether switching costs themselves are a net so-
cial cost: transaction costs and learning costs should be treated as social costs while the implied
impact of the xed re-optimization cost (above the cost itself) and inertial costs should likely not
be included in the welfare calculus.62 We address this issue agnostically in our results section by
presenting the welfare implications of the policy intervention over the possible situations ranging
from full inclusion to no inclusion. We believe that separately identifying these dierent underlying
sources is fertile ground for future work.
Policies That Reduce Switching Costs. There is a general consensus in the policy debate
on the design and regulation of health insurance markets that helping consumers make the best
plan choices possible is unequivocally the right course of action, regardless of the specics of the
environment.63 The recently passed Aordable Care Act (ACA), sets forth guidelines for insurance
exchanges that mandate clear and simple information provision for plan options (see e.g. Kaiser
Family Foundation (2010b). In the employer insurance market many employers, including the one
we study here, have implemented web-based decision tools to try and clearly explain benets to
employees (Kaiser Family Foundation (2010a)). Both of these policies have the potential to sub-
stantially reduce switching costs stemming from either transaction costs or a xed re-optimization
cost. Other policies, such as targeted default options or no default option could reduce the impact of
switching costs in the spirit of our counterfactual if inertia is a prominent source. Simple individual-
specic plan recommendations or streamlining the online plan choice process are additional ways
to reduce multiple switching costs factors. Going forward, these policies, along with a multitude
of other potential interventions, will provide decision-makers with a variety of tools to reduce the
62If a large part of the switching costs we estimate come from the combination of a small re-optimization cost and
specic ex ante beliefs about price and health changes, then we believe that the actual re-optimization cost should
count as a welfare loss but the full estimated switching cost should not.
63Advocates of the health insurance exchanges proposed in the Aordable Care Act (ACA) stress that a well-
informed, optimizing consumer base is essential to realize the benets from insurer competition in these markets (see
e.g. Enthoven et al. (2001)). In the employer-sponsored insurance market there has been a similar emphasis on
providing consumers increased plan options and the capabilities to choose between them Kaiser Family Foundation
(2010a).
32level of switching costs and impact choice in insurance markets.
Insurance Pricing. The two primary parts of the insurance pricing model are (i) average cost-plus
pricing and (ii) a lump sum subsidy for any plan chosen. The former arises naturally as the product
of competition while the latter is a policy designed to encourage consumers to internalize price
signals and choose plans more eciently. However, an environment where consumers fully internal-
ize marginal prices also leads to increased adverse selection since, in general, a smaller and more
expensive prole of consumers will select comprehensive insurance as its relative price increases.64
In our context, this implies that as switching costs are reduced, consumers change plans, and to-
tal premiums change, the employee premium contribution Pkjt will change by the same amount
that the total premium TP
y
jt does. This leads to higher incremental adverse selection relative to
environments where subsidies increase as a function of the total premium.
These features are core components of the managed competition paradigm that motivates the
health insurance exchanges proposed in the ACA (see e.g. Enthoven et al. (2001) and Kaiser Family
Foundation (2010b)) and are also common in the current employer sponsored insurance market.65
Cutler and Reber (1998) propose a risk-adjustment mechanism (incorporated into the ACA) to
layer on top of average cost pricing and lump sum subsidies that will mitigate adverse selection in
the market. Under their framework, employers (or the exchange regulator) can arrange transfers
between insurers to reect dierences in the ex ante risk prole of the consumers these plans enroll.
These transfers link directly to the average cost dierences between the plans such that, in an ideal
setting, plans set premiums that reect consumer valuations for them netting out expected health
expenditures. Consumers still face the full marginal premium dierence in their contributions, but
now these dierences are smaller than those with risk-adjustment because of the transfers. In our
setting, incorporating risk-adjustment into premium setting would lead to a welfare impact bounded
between the rst best and the results we found for each information provision setting. The degree
to which welfare would improve towards the rst-best depends both on (i) the eectiveness of the
risk-adjustment scheme and (ii) the distribution of population preferences.
Finally, it is also interesting to consider how rms competing in a free market would set prices
in response to the switching costs we estimate. There is an extensive literature surveyed in Far-
rell and Klemperer (2007) that considers how rms compete in environments with switching costs.
This work shows that competition in markets with switching costs, even in the absence of adverse
selection, can be quite complex to analyze. For example, Cabral (2008) and Dube et al. (2009)
both investigate environments where switching costs can actually increase competitiveness through
increased up-front competition for consumers. We are unaware of theoretical work studying unreg-
ulated competition in the presence of switching costs and adverse selection and feel future work in
this area could be benecial.
64We note that this is true as long as additional dimensions of heterogeneity, such as preferences, are not highly
negatively correlated with expected health expenditures (see e.g. Einav et al. (2010c) or Cutler et al. (2008)).
65Under an almost identical pricing regime, Cutler and Reber (1998) study the trade-o between competition and
adverse selection resulting from a shift towards lump sum subsidies for the health plans oered at Harvard University.
The authors also discuss multiple empirical cases with similar pricing environments with evidence of adverse selection.
338 Conclusion
In this paper, we leverage a unique natural experiment in combination with individual-level choice
and medical claims data to cleanly identify switching costs in a health insurance market. Several
model-free preliminary analyses reveal that switching costs have a substantial impact on health plan
enrollment as the choice environment evolves over time. We estimate a choice model of decision-
making under uncertainty to quantify switching costs, ex ante health risk, and risk preferences and
use these outputs to study the impact of counterfactual policies that reduce switching costs in a
context with adverse selection.
We nd evidence of high and heterogeneous switching costs: in the base specication the mean
population level is just over $2,000 with a population standard deviation near $500. In a counterfac-
tual setting where we hold insurance prices xed as observed in the data, reducing switching costs
to one-quarter of the estimated values improves consumer welfare by approximately 5% of total pre-
miums paid. However, in the primary counterfactual analysis where insurance prices endogenously
re-adjust to reect the new enrollment patterns, the same reduction in switching costs exacerbates
adverse selection and reduces welfare by 7.7% of premiums paid. We show that welfare is decreas-
ing as the intervention to reduce switching costs becomes more eective and that our main result
is robust to dierent welfare interpretations of switching costs arising from the dierent potential
underlying sources. This result can also be vieweed in the context of the welfare loss from adverse
selection in our observed environment relative to the rst-best. We show that the welfare loss from
adverse selection in the observed environment is 8.2%, implying that the policy to reduce switching
costs eectively doubles the welfare loss from adverse selection. Finally, the results reveal that there
are substantial distributional consequences from the reduction in switching costs, in addition to the
overall eciency loss.
Since improving choice adequacy could have desirable eects not considered here (e.g. enhancing
the eciency of product oerings), and this is one specic setting, we don't take the position that
keeping consumers uninformed is a good intentional policy tool. However, the analysis clearly
reveals that policies to improve consumer choices can have unintended eciency and distributional
consequences in markets with adverse selection. Prior work on choice adequacy either applies
to markets without the potential for adverse selection or ignores this possibility by focusing on
the partial equilibrium impact of improved choices. Policymakers in the health insurance sector
constantly stress the need to improve consumer decision-making capabilities and reduce consumer
switching costs, but likely do so without simultaneously evaluating how other regulatory policies
(e.g. insurance contract characteristics or subsidy schedules) should change to reect society's goals
as the level of decision-making improves. As the capability to reduce consumer switching costs and
improve their choices increases, it will be important for regulators to re-assess and potentially revise
these other market policies to avoid undesirable social outcomes. We believe that a formal analysis
of interactions between policies to improve decision-making and other key market regulations in
setting with potential adverse selection is a valuable direction for future research.
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37Appendix A: Cost Model Setup and Estimation
This appendix describes the details of the cost model, which is summarized at a high-level in
section 4. The output of this model, Fkjt, is a family-plan-time specic distribution of predicted
out-of-pocket expenditures for the upcoming year. This distribution is an important input into the
choice model, where it enters as a family's predictions of its out-of-pocket expenses at the time
of plan choice, for each plan option. We predict this distribution in a sophisticated manner that
incorporates (i) past diagnostic information (ICD-9 codes) (ii) the Johns Hopkins ACG predictive
medical software package (iii) a novel non-parametric model linking modeled health risk to total
medical expenditures using observed cost data and (iv) a detailed division of medical claims and
health plan characteristics to precisely map total medical expenditures to out-of-pocket expenses.66
The unique level of precision we gain from the cost model leads to more credible estimates of the
choice parameters of primary interest (e.g. switching costs).
In order to most precisely predict expenses, we categorize the universe of total medical claims
into four mutually exclusive and exhaustive subdivisions of claims using the claims data. These
categories are (i) hospital and physician (ii) pharmacy (iii) mental health and (iv) physician oce
visit. We divide claims into these four specic categories so that we can accurately characterize the
plan-specic mappings from total claims to out-of-pocket expenditures since each of these categories
maps to out-of-pocket expenditures in a dierent manner. We denote this four dimensional vector
of claims Cit and any given element of that vector Cd;it where d 2 D represents one of the four
categories and i denotes an individual (employee or dependent). After describing how we predict this
vector of claims for a given individual, we return to the question of how we determine out-of-pocket
expenditures in plan j given Cit.
Denote an individual's past year of medical diagnoses and payments by it and the demographics
age and sex by it. We use the ACG software mapping, denoted A, to map these characteristics
into a predicted mean level of health expenditures for the upcoming year, denoted :
A :    ! 
In addition to forecasting a mean level of total expenditures, the software has an application
that predicts future mean pharmacy expenditures. This mapping is analogous to A and outputs a
prediction  for future pharmacy expenses.
We use the predictions  and  to categorize similar groups of individuals across each of four
claims categories in vector in Cit. Then for each group of individuals in each claims category, we
use the actual ex post realized claims for that group to estimate the ex ante distribution for each
individual under the assumption that this distribution is identical for all individuals within the cell.
Individuals are categorized into cells based on dierent metrics for each of the four elements of C:
Pharmacy: it
Hospital / Physician (Non-OV): it
Physician Oce Visit: it
Mental Health: CMH;i;t 1
For pharmacy claims, individuals are grouped into cells based on the predicted future mean phar-
66Features (iii) and (iv) are methodological advances. We are aware of only one previous study that incorporates
diagnostic information in cost prediction for the purposes of studying plan choice (Carlin and Town (2009)) in a
structural setup. Einav et al. (2011) use this type of framework in ongoing work.
38macy claims measure output by the ACG software, it. For the categories of hospital / physician
(non oce visit) and physician oce visit claims individuals are grouped based on their mean pre-
dicted total future health expenses, it. Finally, for mental health claims, individuals are grouped
into categories based on their mental health claims from the previous year, CMH;i;t 1 since (i)
mental health claims are very persistent over time in the data and (ii) mental health claims are
uncorrelated with other health expenditures in the data. For each category we group individuals
into a number of cells between 8 and 10, taking into account the tradeo between cell size and
precision. The minimum number of individuals in any cell is 73 while almost all cells have over
500 members. Thus since there are four categories of claims, each individual can belong to one of
approximately 104 or 10,000 combination of cells.
Denote an arbitrary cell within a given category d by z. Denote the population in a given
category-cell combination (d;z) by Idz. Denote the empirical distribution of ex-post claims in
this category for this population ^ GIdz(). Then we assume that each individual in this cell has a
distribution equal to a continuous t of ^ GIdz(), which we denote Gdz:
$ : ^ GIdz() ! Gdz
We model this distribution continuously in order to easily incorporate correlations across d. Oth-
erwise, it would be appropriate to use GIdz as the distribution for each cell.
The above process generates a distribution of claims for each d and z but does not model
correlation over D. It is important to model correlation over claim categories because it is likely
that someone with a bad expenditure shock in one category (e.g. hospital) will have high expenses in
another area (e.g. pharmacy). We model correlation at the individual level by combining marginal
distributions Gidt 8 d with empirical data on the rank correlations between pairs (d;d0).67 Here,
Gidt is the distribution Gdz where i 2 Idz at time t. Since correlations are modeled across d we pick
the metric  to group people into cells for the basis of determining correlations (we use the same
cells that we use to determine group people for hospital and physician oce visit claims). Denote
these cells based on  by z. Then for each cell z denote the empirical rank correlation between
claims of type d and type d0 by z(d;d0). Then, for a given individual i we determine the joint
distribution of claims across D for year t, denoted Hit(), by combining i's marginal distributions
for all d at t using z(d;d0):
	 : GiDt  zit(D;D0) ! Hit
Here, GiDt refers to the set of marginal distributions Gidt8d 2 D and zit(D;D0) is the set of
all pairwise correlations zit(d;d0)8(d;d0) 2 D2. In estimation we perform 	 by using a Gaussian
copula to combine the marginal distribution with the rank correlations, a process which we describe
momentarily.
The nal part of the cost model maps the joint distribution Hit of the vector of total claims C
over the four categories into a distribution of out of pocket expenditures for each plan. For each
of the three plan options we construct a mapping from the vector of claims C to out of pocket
expenditures OOPj:

j : C ! OOPj
This mapping takes a given draw of claims from Hit and converts it into the out of pocket expendi-
tures an individual would have for those claims in plan j. This mapping accounts for plan-specic
67It is important to use rank correlations here to properly combine these marginal distribution into a joint distri-
bution. Linear correlation would not translate empirical correlations to this joint distribution appropriately.
39features such as the deductible, co-insurance, co-payments, and out of pocket maximums listed in
table 2. I test the mapping 
j on the actual realizations of the claims vector C to verify that our
mapping comes close to reconstructing the true mapping. Our mapping is necessarily simpler and
omits things like emergency room co-payments and out of network claims. We constructed our
mapping with and without these omitted categories to insure they did not lead to an incremental
increase in precision. We nd that our categorization of claims into the four categories in C passed
through our mapping 
j closely approximates the true mapping from claims to out-of-pocket ex-
penses. Further, we nd that it is important to model all four categories described above: removing
any of the four makes 
j less accurate. Figure 6 shows the results of one validation exercise for
PPO250. The top panel reveals that actual employee out-of-pocket spending amounts are quite
close to those predicted by 
j, indicating the precision of this mapping. The bottom panel repeats
this mapping when we add out of network expenses as a fth category. The output in this case is
similar to that in the top panel without this category, implying that including this category would
not markedly change the cost model results.
Once we have a draw of OOPijt for each i (claim draw from Hit passed through 
j) we map
individual out of pocket expenditures into family out of pocket expenditures. For families with less
than two members this involves adding up all the within family OOPijt. For families with more than
three members there are family level restrictions on deductible paid and out-of-pocket maximums
that we adjust for. Dene a family k as a collection of individuals ik and the set of families as K.
Then for a given family out-of-pocket expenditures are generated:
 j : OOPik;jt ! OOPkjt
To create the nal object of interest, the family-plan-time specic distribution of out of pocket
expenditures Fkjt(), we pass the claims distributions Hit through 
j and combine families through
 j. Fkjt() is then used as an input into the choice model that represents each family's information
set over future medical expenses at the time of plan choice. Eventually, we also use Hit to calculate
total plan cost when we analyze counterfactual plan pricing based on the average cost of enrollees.
Figure 7 outlines the primary components of the cost model pictorially to provide a high-level
overview and to ease exposition.
We note that the decision to do the cost model by grouping individuals into cells, rather then by
specifying a more continuous form, has costs and benets. The cost is that all individuals within a
given cell for a given type of claims are treated identically. The benet is that our method produces
local cost estimates for each individual that are not impacted by the combination of functional form
and the health risk of medically dierent individuals. Also, the method we use allows for exible
modeling across claims categories. Finally, we note that we map the empirical distribution of claims
to a continuous representation because this is convenient for building in correlations in the next
step. The continuous distributions we generate very closely t the actual empirical distribution of
claims across these four categories.
Cost Model Identication and Estimation. The cost model is identied based on the two
assumptions of (i) no moral hazard / selection based on private information and (ii) that individ-
uals within the same cells for claims d have the same ex ante distribution of total claims in that
category. Once these assumptions are made, the model uses the detailed medical data, the Johns
Hopkins predictive algorithm, and the plan-specic mappings for out of pocket expenditures to
generate the the nal output Fkjt(). These assumptions, and corresponding robustness analyses,
are discussed at more length in the main text.
Once we group individuals into cells for each of the four claims categories, there are two statistical
40components to estimation. First, we need to generate the continuous marginal distribution of claims
for each cell z in claim category d, Gdz. To do this, we t the empirical distribution of claims GIdz
to a Weibull distribution with a mass of values at 0. We use the Weibull distribution instead of the
lognormal distribution, which is traditionally used to model medical expenditures, because we nd
that the lognormal distribution overpredicts large claims in the data while the Weibull does not.















Here, ^ dz and ^ dz are the shape and scale parameters that characterize the Weibull distribution.
Denoting this distribution W( ^ dz; ^ dz) the estimated distribution ^ Gdz is formed by combining this
with the estimated mass at zero claims, which is the empirical likelihood:
^ Gdz(c) =
(
GIdz(0) if c = 0
GIdz(0) +
W( ^ dz; ^ dz)(c)
1 GIdz(0) if c > 0
Again, we use the notation ^ GiDt to represent the set of marginal distributions for i over the
categories d: the distribution for each d depends on the cell z an individual i is in at t. We
combine the distributions ^ GiDt for a given i and t into the joint distribution Hit using a Gaussian
copula method for the mapping 	. Intuitively, this amounts to assuming a parametric form for
correlation across ^ GiDt equivalent to that from a standard normal distribution with correlations
equal to empirical rank correlations zit(D;D0) described in the previous section. Let i
1j2j3j4
denote the standard multivariate normal distribution with pairwise correlations zit(D;D0) for all
pairings of the four claims categories D. Then an individual's joint distribution of non-zero claims
is:
^ Hi;t() = 1j2j3j4( 1
1 ( ^ Gid1t); 1
2 ( ^ Gid2t); 1
3 ( ^ Gid3t); 1
4 ( ^ Gid4t))))
Above, d is the standard marginal normal distribution for each d. ^ Hi;t is the joint distribution
of claims across the four claims categories for each individual in each time period. After this is
estimated, we determine our nal object of interest Fkjt() by simulating K multivariate draws
from ^ Hi;t for each i and t, and passing these values through the plan-specic total claims to out of
pocket mapping 
j and the individual to family out of pocket mapping  j. The simulated Fkjt()
for each k, j, and t is then used as an input into estimation of the choice model.
Table 13 presents summary results from the cost model estimation for the nal choice model
sample, including population statistics on the ACG index , the Weibull distribution parameters
^ dz and ^ dz for each category d, as well as the across category rank correlations zit(D;D0). These
are the fundamentals inputs used to generate Fkjt, as described above, and lead to very accurate
characterizations of the overall total cost and out-of-pocket cost distributions (validation exercises
which are not presented here).
41Appendix B: Choice Model Estimation Algorithm Details
This appendix describes the details of the choice model estimation algorithm. The corresponding
section in the text provided a high-level overview of this algorithm and outlined the estimation
assumptions we make regarding choice model fundamentals and their links to observable data.
We estimate the choice model using a random coecients probit simulated maximum likelihood
approach similar to that summarized in Train (2009). The simulated maximum likelihood estimation
approach has the minimum variance for a consistent and asymptotically normal estimator, while not
being too computationally burdensome in our framework. Since we use panel data, the likelihood
function at the family level is computed for a sequence of choices from t0 to t2, since switching costs
imply that the likelihood of a choice made in the current period depends on the choice made in the
previous period. The maximum likelihood estimator selects the parameter values that maximize
the similarity between actual choices and choices simulated with the parameters.
First, the estimator simulates Q draws from the distribution of health expenditures output from
the cost model, Fkjt, for each family, plan, and time period. These draws are used to compute plan
expected utility conditional on all other preference parameters. It then simulates S draws for each
family from the distributions of the random coecients k and k, as well as from the distribution
of the preference shocks j(Yk). We dene the set of parameters  as the full set of ex ante model
parameters (before the S draws are taken):
  (;;2
;(Yk);(Yk);;J(Yk);J(Yk);0;1;2):
We denote sk one draw derived from these parameters for each family, including the parameters
constant across draws:
sk  (k;k;;JT;0;1;2)
Denote Sk the set of all S simulated draws for family k. For each sk the estimator then uses all
Q health draws to compute family-plan-time-specic expected utilities Uskjt following the choice
model outlined in earlier in section 4. Given these expected utilities for each sk, we simulate the
probability of choosing plan j in each period using a smoothed accept-reject function with the form:

















This smoothed accept-reject methodology follows that outlined in Train (2009) with some slight
modications to account for the expected utility specication. In theory, conditional on sk, we
would want to pick the j that maximizes Ukjt for each family, and then average over S to get
nal choice probabilities. However, doing this leads to a likelihood function with at regions,
because for small changes in the estimated parameters , the discrete choice made does not change.
The smoothing function above mimics this process for CARA utility functions: as the smoothing
parameter  becomes large the smoothed Accept-Reject simulator becomes almost identical to the
true Accept-Reject simulator just described, where the actual utility-maximizing option is chosen
with probability one. By choosing  to be large, an individual will always choose j when 1
 Ukjt >
1
 Ukjt8j 6= j. The smoothing function is modied from the logit smoothing function in Train (2009)
for two reasons (i) CARA utilities are negative, so the choice should correspond to the utility with
the lowest absolute value and (ii) the logit form requires exponentiating the expected utility, which
42in our case is already the sum of exponential functions (from CARA). This double exponentiating
leads to computational issues that our specication overcomes, without any true content change
since both models approach the true Accept-Reject function.
Denote any sequence of three choices made as j3 and the set of such sequences as J3. In the limit
as  grows large the probability of a given j3 will either approach 1 or 0 for a given simulated draw
s and family k. This is because for a given draw the sequence (j1;j2;j3) will either be the sequential
utility maximizing sequence or not. This implicitly includes the appropriate level of switching costs
by conditioning on previous choices within the sequential utility calculation. For example, under
sk a choice in period two will be made by a family k only if it is optimal conditional on sk, other
preference factors, and the switching costs implies by the period one choice. For all S simulation
draws we compute the optimal sequence of choices for k with the smoothed Accept-Reject simulator,
denoted j3
sk. For any set of parameter values Sk the probability that the model predicts j3 will be


















k ;Hk;Yk). Conditional on these prob-
abilities for each k, the simulated log-likelihood value for parameters  is:





Here dkj3 is an indicator function equal to one if the actual sequence of decisions made by
family k was j3. Then the maximum simulated likelihood estimator (MSLE) is the value of  in
the parameter space  that maximizes SLL(). In the results presented in the text, we choose
Q = 100, S = 50, and  = 4, all values large enough such that the estimated parameters vary little
in response to changes.
Appendix C: Moral Hazard Robustness analysis
In the text we discuss a robustness specication that investigates the cost model assumption of no
moral hazard. To do this we necessarily make some substantial simplifying assumptions: for a full
structural treatment of moral hazard in health insurance utilization see, e.g., Cardon and Hendel
(2001), Einav et al. (2011) or Kowalski (2011). We implement the moral hazard robustness check
by adjusting the output of the cost model to reect lower total utilization in the less comprehensive
plans (and vice-versa). The intent is to show that even when including price elasticities that are
quite large relative to those found in the literature, the model output for switching costs and risk
preferences does not change substantially. While the specication addresses moral hazard, it also
sheds light on whether our estimates are sensitive to consumers having a reasonable level of private
information above and beyond the detailed medical data we observe.
We operationalize this test in the following steps. First, we nd the implied total spending
changes across plans in the population for a price elasticity of -1.3, well higher than the range of
-0.1 to -0.4 that represents most of the literature (for further discussion, see Chandra et al. (2010)).
To do this we perform a back of the envelope calculation for the arc-elasticity of demand with
respect to price, following the prior work of Einav et al. (2011) and Newhouse (1993). For this
calculation, we use the average share of out-of-pocket spending for each plan as the price, and
total medical expenditures as the quantity. For the three plans we study, the empirical shares of
out-of-pocket spending are 15.5%, 20.9%, and 23.4% going from most to least comprehensive. We
use these prices together with the average total spending of $13,331 in PPO 1 at t 1 as the basis
43for this calculation. The formula for the arc-elasticity is:
Elasticity =
(q2   q1)=(q2 + q1)
(p2   p1)=(p2 + p1)
We use the conservative elasticity of -1.3 and solve for the corresponding total cost changes this price
response implies (here, pj are the empirical shares of out-of-pocket spending for each plan and qj is
implied total spending in plan j). Solving for q2 as a percentage of q1 implies an, approximately, 25%
reduction in total spending moving from PPO250 to PPO500, a 33% reduction in total spending
moving from PPO250 to PP01200, and a 10% reduction in total spending moving from PPO500
to PPO1200. We then apply these reductions (or increases when moving into more comprehensive
plans) and adjust the output of the cost model Fkjt according to the potential plan being chosen
and the previous plan the family actually enrolled and incurred costs in. These new 'moral hazard
adjusted' Fkjt then are input into the choice model, which is otherwise specied and estimated as
in the text. The results from the analysis are presented in column 3 of table 7 and suggest that the
initial assumption of no moral hazard does not markedly change our estimates of switching costs or
risk preferences.68
It is important to point out that this exercise does not explicitly model the value of additional
health spending, which the literature does through a non-linear budget constraint model where
the family trades o the value of extra spending with the price of medical care (see Cardon and
Hendel (2001), Einav et al. (2011) or Kowalski (2011)). Moral hazard here is captured purely
by dierences in spending. For a family that chooses PPO500 or PPO1200 in the data and is
considering switching to PPO250, our moral hazard cost wedge serves as an upper bound for the
expected utility dierence between these two plans and the more comprehensive plan, since their
actual choice implies they value the increase in medical services less than the corresponding overall
utility gain from a dierent nancial lottery. The reverse is not true: for consumers considering
switching to a less comprehensive plan our out-of-pocket cost wedge may not be an upper bound
value of utility dierences between two plans. However, we view this as a conservative approach in
this case, since the high elasticity we've chosen together with the dierences in the marginal prices
of care between the plans (and the resulting implications for value of medical care foregone) make it
unlikely that the value wedge between prospective plans is larger in reality than in this specication.
68In prior work, Handel (2010) presented evidence that the combined eect of moral hazard and selection on private
information is not large in our setting. This suggests that the elasticity choice here of -1.3 represents more moral
hazard than actually exists in our environment, implying this is a conservative approach.
44Figure 1: This gure describes the relationship between total medical expenses (plan plus employee) and
employee out-of-pocket expenses in years t0 and t1 for PPO250 and PPO500. This mapping depends on
employee premiums, deductible, coinsurance, and out of pocket maximum. This chart applies to low income
families (premiums vary by number of dependents covered and income tier, so there are similar charts for all
20 combinations of these two variables). Premiums are treated as pre-tax expenditures while medical expenses
are treated as post-tax. The bottom panel presents the analogous chart for time t1 when premiums changed
signicantly. This can be seen by the change in the vertical intercepts. At time t0 healthier employees were
better o in PPO500 and sicker employees were better o in PPO250. For this combination of income and
dependents covered, at time t1 all employees should choose PPO500 regardless of their total claim levels, i.e.
PPO250 is dominated by PPO500. Despite this, many employees who chose PPO250 in t0 continue to do so
at t1, indicative of high switching costs.
45Figure 2: This gure describes the evolution of employee premium contributions at the rm over
time between years t0 and t2. Employee premium contributions depend both on the number of
dependents covered and the employee income tier. The top panel describes premiums for single
employees and the bottom panel relates to families (employee + spouse + dependent(s)). The
gure illustrates the large relative employee premium contribution changes between t0 and t1 across
tiers. For example, a family in income tier ve experienced a $2,580 increase in PPO250 premium
relative to PPO500. The process for premium setting leading to this evolution over described is
described and modeled in detail in section six.
46Figure 3: This gure describes the new plan enrollment levels and average costs under the 'naive' information
provision counterfactual where consumer switching costs are reduced but prices are held xed as observed
in the data. The market shares are presented for all coverage tiers combined, while the average costs are
presented for the family coverage tier (employee + spouse + dependent). The gure studies these quantities
as a function of the eectiveness of the policy to reduce switching cost, where  signies no reduction in
switching costs from our estimates and 0 signies a complete elimination of them. In general, the market
share of PPO250 is decreasing in both t1 and t2 as the policy to reduce switching costs becomes more eective.
The relative average cost of this plan increases as the market share declines, implying that when we allow
for endogenous plan re-pricing there will be increased adverse selection on the margin.
47Figure 4: The top panel of this gure presents the time path of choices for PPO250 and PPO500 with
and without the policy intervention to reduce switching costs. With endogenous plan pricing, the impact of
the policy intervention on the market share of PPO250 relative to PPO500 is noticeable. In the benchmark
case where there are signicant switching costs  over the six year period the market share of PPO250
declines from 1147 to 744 while that of PPO500 increases from 647 to 1134. After the policy intervention
reduces switching costs to :25, PPO250 enrollment declines all the way to 385 after six years while PPO500
enrollment increases to 1501. In between t0 and t6, there are also noticeable dierences in plan enrollment
as a result of the policy intervention. The bottom panel in the gure shows the change in average costs for
the family coverage tier under the policy intervention relative to the benchmark case of full switching costs.
The average costs of PPO250 increase over time relative to those of PPO500, signaling an increased relative
premium for PPO250 and increased adverse selection.
48Figure 5: This gure shows market shares and average costs for PP0500 and PPO250 in years t1, t2, and t4,
as a function of Z, in the environment with endogenous plan pricing. We report results for values of Z equal
to 0,.25,.5, and 1. It is clear from the top panel that as Z decreases, and information provision becomes more
eective, enrollment in PPO250 declines at the expense of enrollment in PPO500. The bottom panel reveals
that as Z decreases and enrollment increases, the average costs (and total premiums) of PPO250 increase
relative to those of PPO500 in each year. This is indicative of increased relative premiums for comprehensive
insurance and increased adverse selection.
49Figure 6: This gure validates the mapping 
j that translates the vector of total claims C into
plan specic out of pocket expenditures. The two charts show 
 for PPO250, with predicted out-of-
pocket spending on the x-axis and actual out-of-pocket spending on the y-axis. The top chart is the
mapping actually used where claims are categorized into four categories (i) hospital and outpatient
(ii) pharmacy (iii) mental health and (iv) physician oce visit. Ideally, we want all points to be
on the 45 degree line where the actual employee paid out of pocket equals the model predicted out
of pocket. The plot is condensed around the 45 degree line so we believe this our mapping is close
to the true mapping. The bottom gure adds out of network expenses to the mapping as a fth
category and does not materially improve upon the mapping used.
50Figure 7: This gure outlines the primary steps of the cost model described in Appendix A.It moves
from the initial inputs of cost data, diagnostic data, and the ACG algorithm to the nal output
Fkjt which is the family, plan, time specic distribution of out-of-pocket expenditures that enters
the choice model for each family. The gure depicts an example individual in the top segment,
corresponding to one cell in each category of medical expenditures. The last part of the model
maps the expenditures for all individuals in one family into the nal distribution Fkjt.
51Sample Demographics
All Employees PPO Ever Final Sample
N - Employee Only 11,253 5,667 2,023
N - All Family Members 20,963 10,713 4,544
Mean Employee Age (Median) 40.1 40.0 42.3
(37) (37) (44)
Gender (Male %) 46.7% 46.3% 46.7%
Income
Tier 1 ( < $41K) 33.9% 31.9% 19.0%
Tier 2 ($41K-$72K) 39.5% 39.7% 40.5%
Tier 3 ($72K-$124K) 17.9% 18.6% 25.0%
Tier 4 ($124K-$176K) 5.2% 5.4% 7.8%
Tier 5 ( > $176K) 3.5% 4.4% 7.7%
Family Size
1 58.0 % 56.1 % 41.3 %
2 16.9 % 18.8 % 22.3 %
3 11.0 % 11.0 % 14.1 %
4+ 14.1 % 14.1 % 22.3 %
Sta Grouping
Manager (%) 23.2% 25.1% 37.5%
White-Collar (%) 47.9% 47.5% 41.3%
Blue-Collar (%) 28.9% 27.3% 21.1%
Additional Demographics
Quantitative Manager 12.8% 13.3% 20.7%
Job Tenure Mean Years (Median) 7.2 7.1 10.1
(4) (3) (6)
Zip Code Population Mean (Median) 42,925 43,319 41,040
(42,005) (42,005) (40,175)
Zip Code Income Mean (Median) $56,070 $56,322 $60,948
($55,659) ($55,659) ($57,393)
Zip Code House Value Mean (Median) $226,886 $230,083 $245,380
($204,500) ($209,400) ($213,300)
Table 1: This table presents summary demographic statistics for the population we study. The rst column
describes demographics for the entire sample whether or not they ever enroll in insurance with the rm. The
second column summarizes these variables for the sample of individuals who ever enroll in a PPO option,
the choices we focus on in the empirical analysis. The third column describes our nal estimation sample,
which includes those employees who (i) are enrolled in PPO 1 at t 1 and (ii) remain enrolled in any plan
at the rm through at least t1. Comparing the columns shows little selection on demographics into PPO




Individual Deductible (Family) 250 500 1200
(750) (1500) (2400)
Coinsurance Rate 10% 20% 20%
Physician Oce Visit Copay 25 25 NA
Emergency Room Copay 100 100 NA
Mental Health Coinsurance 50% 50% 50%
Prescription Drug Copay 5/25/45* 5/25/45* NA
(10/50/75) (10/50/75) NA
Individual OOP Max (Family)
Income Tier 1 ( < $41K) 1000 1500 2000
(3000) (4500) (6000)
Income Tier 2-3 ($41K-$124K) 2000 3000 4000
(5000) (7000) (8000)
Income tier 4-5 (> $124K) 3000 4000 5000
(8000) (9000) (10000)
Other Features
Free Preventative Care No No Yes
Traditional FSA Eligible Yes Yes No
HSA Eligible No No Yes
* Prescription copay max of 1500 per person.
Copays for 30-day supply. 90-day supply copay in parentheses.
Copays increase in t2 by approx. 20%
** Oce visit and pharmacy claims only apply to OOP max for PPO1200
Table 2: This table describes the nancial characteristics for each PPO option available at the rm after
the menu change at t0. For most medical expenses, an individual pays the full amount until he reaches the
yearly plan deductible, after which he pays the coinsurance rate for all further medical expenses. Once an
individual spends up to the out-of-pocket maximum, he pays no further general medical expenses. Pharmacy
products and physician oce visits only apply to the deductible and coinsurance for PPO1200; all other plans
have xed co-payments for these services. Mental health services apply to all plan deductibles but not the
out-of-pocket maximum for each plan. Out-of-pocket maximums vary with income, presumably for equity
considerations. This chart does not include out-of-network plan characteristics which account for only 2% of
total expenses and don't vary substantially across the three plans. These three plans have the same provider
network and cover the same medical services.
53Choice Behavior
t 1 t0 t1
PPO250 - 2,199 (25%) 1,937 (21%)
PPO500 - 998 (11%) 1,544 (18%)
PPO1200 - 876 (10%) 824 (9%)
HMO1 2,094 (25%) 2,050 (23%) 2,031 (22%)
HMO2 701 (8%) 1,273 (14%) 1,181 (13%)
PPO 1 3,264 (39%) - -
HMO3 668 (8%) - -
HMO4 493 (6%) - -
Waive 1,207 (14%) 1,447 (16%) 1,521 (17%)
Switching Behavior






t1 plan / t0 plan PPO250 PPO500 PPO1200 HMO1 HMO2
PPO250 1,732 14 14 21 8
PPO500 129 774 112 31 31
PPO1200 17 11 577 12 15
HMO1 10 7 8 1,694 22
HMO2 9 6 5 6 983
Table 3: This table describes plan choice at the rm between years t 1 and t1. The top panel documents the
number of employees who chose each plan in each of these three years. Before the menu change about 39%
of employees enrolled in a PPO and 47% in an HMO. After the menu change these numbers are essentially
reversed with 47% in a PPO and 35% in an HMO. The middle panel studies the choice behavior of all
employees at the rm who were enrolled in any plan in both of the years t 1 and t0. Each column corresponds
to the plan an employee was in at t 1 while each row corresponds to the plan an employee was in at t0. It
is clear that, when the menu of plans changed for t0, most employees in PPO 1 moved to one of the new
PPO options while most employees enrolled in an HMO at t 1 still re-enroll in an HMO at t0. The bottom
panel presents the analogous chart for all employees at the rm enrolled in a plan both in years t0 and t1.
The vast majority of t0 PPO enrollees who switch plans at year t1 choose another PPO option at t1. These
panels together reveal signicant horizontal dierentiation between the nest of PPOs and nest of HMOs.
54New Enrollee Analysis
New Enrollee t 1 New Enrollee t0 New Enrollee t1
N, t0 1056 1377 -
N, t1 784 1267 1305
t0 Choices
PPO250 259 (25%) 287 (21%) -
PPO500 205 (19%) 306 (23%) -
PPO1200 155 (15%) 236 (17%) -
HMO1 238 (23%) 278 (20%) -
HMO2 199 (18%) 270 (19%) -
t1 Choices
PPO250 182 (23%) 253 (20%) 142 (11%)
PPO500 201 (26%) 324 (26%) 562 (43%)
PPO1200 95 (12%) 194 (15%) 188 (14%)
HMO1 171 (22%) 257 (20%) 262 (20%)
HMO2 135 (17%) 239 (19%) 151 (12%)
Demographics
Mean Age 33 33 32
Median Age 31 31 31
Female % 56% 54% 53%
Manager % 20% 18% 19%
FSA Enroll % 15% 12% 14%
Dental Enroll % 88% 86% 86%
Median (Mean) Expense t1 844 (4758) 899 (5723) -
Income Tier 1 48% 50% 47%
Income Tier 2 33% 31% 32%
Income Tier 3 10% 10% 12%
Income Tier 4 5% 4% 4%
Income Tier 5 4% 5% 5%
Table 4: This table describes the choice behavior of new employees at the rm over several consecutive years
and presents our rst model-free test of switching costs. Each column describes one cohort of new employees
at the rm, corresponding to a specic year of arrival. First, the chart describes the health insurance choices
made by these cohorts in year t0 (the year of the insurance plan menu change) and in the following year, t1.
The last part of the chart lists the demographics for each cohort of new arrivals at the time of their arrival.
Given the very similar demographic proles and large sample size for each cohort, if there are no switching
costs, the t1 choices of employees who entered the rm at t0 and t 1 should be identical to the t1 choices of
employees who entered the rm at t1. The table shows that, in fact, the active choices made by the t1 cohort
are quite dierent than those of the prior cohorts in the manner we would expect with high switching costs:
the t1 choices of employees who enter at t0 and t 1 reect both t1 prices and t0 choices while the t1 choices
of new employees at t1 reect t1 prices. New employees at t0 do not adjust to the signicant price change
from t0 to t1 while new employees' choices do reect these price changes. This illustrates the large impact
that switching costs have on choices in our setting, independent of the choice model setup and structure.
55Dominated Plan Analysis
t1 t1 t2 t2
Dominated Stay Dominated Switch Dominated Stay Dominated Switch
N 498 61 378 126
Minimum Money Lost* $374 $453 $396 $306
PPO500 - 44 (72%) - 103 (81%)
PPO1200 - 4 (7%) - 6(5%)
Any HMO - 13 (21%) - 17 (14%)
FSA t1 25.4% 32.1% 27.2% 28.6%
FSA t2 - - 28.1% 30.9%
Dental Switch t1 4.3% 14.1% 3.5% 10.9%
Dental Switch t2 - - 6.9% 17.2%
Age (mean) 44.9 38.3 46.2 41.4
Income Tier (mean)** 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.7
Quant. Manager 11% 8% 11% 11%
Single (%) 40% 41% 40% 33%
Male (%) 42% 46% 39% 55%
All Plan Analysis
PPO250 Stay t1 PPO250 Switch t1 All Plans t1 Stay All Plans t1 Switch
Sample Size 1626 174 2786 384
FSA 2008 Enrollee 31% 41% 25% 39%
Dental Switch 3.2% 13.1% 3.8% 14.5%
Age (mean) 48.3 40.6 44.0 39.1
Income Tier (mean)** 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.1
Quant. Manager 20% 17% 17% 14%
Single (%) 50% 56% 53% 59%
Male (%) 48% 42% 49% 40%
Table 5: This top panel in this table proles the choices and demographics of the employees enrolled in
PPO250 at t0 who (i) continue to enroll in a rm plan in t1 and (ii) have PPO250 become dominated for
them at t1. The majority of these employees (498 out of 559 (89%)) remain in PPO250 even after it becomes
dominated by PPO500 with 378 of 504 (25%) still remaining in this plan at t2. People who do switch are more
likely to exhibit a pattern of active choice behavior in general as evidenced by their higher FSA enrollments
and level of dental plan switching. Apart from this, these populations are similar though switchers in this
group are slightly younger. The bottom panel studies the proles of those who switch at t1 and those who
don't for the two groups of (i) PPO250 enrollees at t0 and (ii) the entire universe of PPO plan enrollees
present in t0 and t1. This reveals a similar pattern of active decision making as switchers in these populations
are also more likely to enroll in FSAs and switch dental plans.
56Final Sample Total Expenses
PPO 1 PPO250 PPO500 PPO1200
Family t 1 Total Expenses ($)
t 1
N Employees (Mean Family Size) 2,022 (2.24) - - -
Mean (Median) 13,331 (4916) - - -
25th pct. 1,257 - - -
75th pct. 13,022 - - -
t0
N (Mean Family Size) - 1328 (2.18) 414 (2.20) 280 (2.53)
Mean (Median) - 16,976 (6,628) 6,151 (2,244) 6,742 (2,958)
25th pct. - 2,041 554 658
75th pct. - 16,135 6,989 8,073
t1
N (Mean Family Size) - 1,244 (2.19) 546 (2.19) 232 (2.57)
Mean (Median) - 17,270 (6,651) 7,759 (2,659) 6,008 (2,815)
25th pct. - 2,041 708 589
75th pct. - 16,707 8,588 7,191
Individual Category Expenses
Pharmacy
Mean $973 $1420 $586 $388
Median $81 $246 $72 $22
Mental Health (>0)
Mean $2401 $2228 $1744 $2134
Median $1260 $1211 $1243 $924
Hospital / Physician
Mean $4588 $5772 $2537 $2722
Median $428 $717 $255 $366
Physician OV
Mean $461 $571 $381 $223
Median $278 $356 $226 $120
Table 6: This table investigates the extent of adverse selection across PPO options after the t0 menu change
for those in the nal estimation sample. All individuals in this sample were enrolled in PPO 1 in t 1 and
continue to be enrolled in some plan at the rm for the following two years. The numbers in the table for
all choices represent t 1 total claims in dollars so that these costs can proxy for health risk without being
confounded by moral hazard (t0 and t1 costs could be the result of selection or moral hazard). The table
reveals that those who choose PPO250 have much higher expenditures at t 1 than those who choose the
other two plans, implying substantial selection on observables in the vein of Finkelstein and Poterba (2006).
The bottom panel presents a breakdown of these costs according to our cost model expenditure categories.
57Empirical Model Results
Parameter Primary Base MH Robust  Robust  Robust
Switching Cost - Single, 0 1729 1779 1859 2430 1944
(28) (72) (107) (116) (150)
Switching Cost - Family, 0 + 2 2480 2354 2355 3006 2365
(26) (62) (113) (94) (34)
SC - FSA Enroll, 1 -551 - -669 -723 -417
(56) - (155) (131) (50)
SC - Income, 1 -32 - -59 -8 -7
(13) - (15) (43) (15)
SC - Quantitative, 1 5 - -40 -537 -6
(138) - (80) (223) (92)
SC - Manager, 1 198 - 277 875 224
(292) - (164) (200) (244)
SC - Chronic Condition, 1 80 - 29 -221 67
(46) - (67) (148) (35)
SC - Salient Change, 1 156 - 95 61 123
(83) - (60) (212) (54)
SC - PPO1200, 1 -19 - -32 -327 -113
(184) - (46) (122) (52)
SC - Total Pop. Mean,  2032 2087 1886 1914 1986
[Pop. Standard Deviation] [446] [286] [387] [731] [316]
Risk Aversion Mean - Intercept ,  2:32  10 4 3:12  10 4 2:31  10 4 -8.94 1:90  10 4
(9:0  10 6) (1:1  10 5) (1:1  10 5) (0.43) (1:0  10 5)
Risk Aversion Mean - Income , 2:90  10 5 4:21  10 5 1:80  10 5 0.07 2:40  10 5
(4:0  10 6) (3:0  10 6) (3:0  10 6) (0.016) (3:0  10 6)
Risk Aversion Mean - Age ,  2:27  10 6 - 3:45  10 6 0.28 2:59  10 6
(1:7  10 7) - (1:8  10 7) (0.011) (1:5  10 7)
Risk Aversion Std. Deviation ,  1:88  10 4 1:19  10 4 1:27  10 4 1.37 1:04  10 4
(6:6  10 5) (8:0  10 6) (6:0  10 6) (0.06) (5:9  10 5)
CDHP - Single - RC Mean ,  -2912 -3665 -2801 -2985 -2833
(754) (218) (416) (85) (130)
CDHP - Single - RC Variance,  843 1283 1070 989 1141
(431) (104) (139) (70) (113)
CDHP - Family - RC Mean ,  -2871 -4847 -2614 -5344 -2932
(73) (204) (115) (134) (40)
CDHP - Family - RC Variance,  897 1733 1149 2179 1013
(28) (99) (132) (80) (31)
High Total Cost - PPO250,  856 937 607 1386 860
(50) (175) (55) (264) (66)
500 - Single 204 60 51 50 -
(13) (67) (30) (55) -
1200 - Single 502 872 647 161 -
(475) (122) (228) (72) -
500 - Family 329 180 789 90 -
(25) (94) (28) (89) -
1200 - Family 811 888 715 676 -
(25) (104) (44) (426) -
Table 7: This table presents the estimated parameter results for the primary choice model from section 4
and the four robustness checks outlined in section 5. All non-risk aversion coecients are in dollar units
with standard errors for parameters given in parentheses. The results from the Primary specication are the
inputs into the counterfactual simulations presented in section six.
58Risk Preference Analysis
Absolute Risk Aversion Interpretation
Normal Heterogeneity
Mean / Median Individual 4:22  10 4 94.6
25th percentile 2:95  10 4 96.1
75th percentile 5:49  10 4 93.8
95th percentile 7:31  10 4 92.2
99th percentile 8:59  10 4 91.8
Log normal Heterogeneity
Mean 9:82  10 4 91.0
25th percentile 1:53  10 4 97.2
Median 3:85  10 4 95.0
75th percentile 9:72  10 4 91.1
95th percentile 3:70  10 3 72.8
99th percentile 9:30  10 3 51.1
Comparable Estimates
Cohen and Einav (2007) Benchmark Mean 3:1  10 3 76.5
Cohen and Einav (2007) Benchmark Median 3:4  10 5 99.7
Gertner (1993) 3:1  10 4 97.0
Holt and Laury (2002) 3:2  10 2 21.0
Sydnor (2010) 2:0  10 3 83.3
Table 8: This table examines the risk preference estimates from the empirical results presented in table
7. The rst section of the table is for the normally distributed risk preference estimates in the Primary
specication, where the age and income coecients are evaluated at the median values of those variables.
The second section is for the model with log-normally distributed preferences studied in column 4 of table
7. The interpretation column is the value X that would make someone indierent about accepting a 50-50
gamble where you win $100 and lose X versus a status quo where nothing happens. Our estimates are similar
under both specications with the exception that the log normal model predicts a fatter tail with higher risk
aversion. These estimates are in the middle of the (wide) range found in the literature and show moderate
risk aversion except at the tails in the log-normal model where consumers are quite risk averse.




Switchers Only $175 $196
Mean Welfare Change: % Total Premiums
Mean Employee Premium (MEP) $2,067 $1,954
Welfare Change Population 4.6% 5.8%
Welfare Change Switchers 8.5% 10.0%
Mean Welfare Change: % Total Emp. Spending
Mean Total Emp. Spending $4,373 $4,486
Welfare Change Population 2.2% 2.5%
Welfare Change Switchers 4.0% 4.4%
Mean Welfare Change: % kCEQk
Mean Total kCEQk $6,694 $6,773
Welfare Change Population 1.4% 1.7%
Welfare Change Switchers 2.6% 2.9%
Table 9: This table presents the welfare results of the 'naive' counterfactual information provision analysis.
We present the mean per employee per year dollar change in certainty equivalents and corresponding per-
centage welfare changes resulting from the policy intervention that reduces switching costs to .25 from .
We present three alternative welfare benchmarks to assess the % impact of this these certainty equivalent
changes. These metrics divide the change in certainty equivalent from the policy intervention by mean (i)
total employee premiums (ii) total employee spending and (iii) the absolute value of the certainty equivalent
loss. Note that since all gures are losses the certainty equivalent absolute value is larger than the total
spending gure. Since we hold plan prices xed in this exercise, the welfare changes must be positive when
consumers make better individual-level decisions.
60Full Equilibrium Welfare Analysis
Information Provision:  to .25
t1 t2 t4 t6 Avg. t1-t6
Mean  CEQ
Population -$63 -$104 -$144 -$118 -$115
Switcher Pop. % 51% 49% 48% 53% 49%
Switchers Only $86 $175 $ 245 $242 $186
Non-Switchers Only -$205 -$391 -$555 -$432 -$442
High Expense Pop.a % 10% 11% 11% 11% 11%
High Expense $26 $106 $119 $65 $62
Non-High Expense -$73 -$130 -$177 -$141 -$137
Single Pop. % 47% 46% 46% 46% 46%
Single -$249 -$367 -$414 -$195 -$319
w/ Dependents $99 $124 $89 -$51 $61
Low Income Pop.b % 40% 41% 41% 41% 41%
Low Income -$81 -$218 -$282 -$178 -$200
High Income -$36 $62 $57 -$30 $0
Welfare Change: % Premiumsc
Mean Employee Premium $1,471 $1,591 $1,455 $1,259 $1,500
Welfare Change Population -4.8% -6.5% -9.9% -9.4% -7.7%
Welfare Change Switchers 5.6% 11.0% 16.9% 19.2% 12.4%
Welfare Change Non-Switchers -13.9% -24.6% -38.1% -34.3% -29.4%
Welfare Change: % Total Spendingd
Mean Total Emp. Spending $3,755 $4,097 $4,022 $3,862 $4,015
Welfare Change Population -1.7% -2.5% -3.6% -3.06% -2.9%
Welfare Change Switchers 2.3% 4.3% 6.1% 6.3% 4.6%
Welfare Change Non-Switchers -5.5% -9.5% -13.8% -11.2% -11.0%
Welfare Change: % kCEQke Loss
Mean Total kCEQk $5,888 $6,264 $6,207 $6,065 $6,190
Welfare Change Population -1.1% -1.7% -2.3% -2.0% -1.9%
Welfare Change Switchers 1.5% 2.8% 4.0% 4.0% 3.0%
Welfare Change Non-Switchers -3.5% -6.2% -8.9% -7.1% -7.1%
Table 10: This table presents the welfare results of the endogenous insurance pricing policy counterfactual
for the case where switching costs are reduced from  to 0.25. We present the change in the mean per
employee per year certainty equivalent moving from the simulation with full switching costs to reduced
switching costs. In addition to studying the eect of the policy on eciency, we study the distributional
eects based on four categorizations (i) `switchers', or people who are in a dierent plan at time t under the
policy intervention than without it (ii) an indicator of whether or not the family has high health costs relative
to its coverage tier (iii) whether an employee is single or covers dependents and (iv) whether an employee
has high or low income. We present the same welfare metrics as in table 9, taking the ratio of the change
in certainty equivalent with respect to (i) total employee premiums (ii) total employee spending and (iii) the
absolute value of the certainty equivalent loss.
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Information Provision Range
First-Best Baseline .75 .5 .25 0
Mean  CEQ
(% of Premiums)
Population $123 - -$41 -$73 -$115 -$107
(8.2%) (-) (-2.7%) (-4.9%) (-7.7%) (-7.1%)
Switchers -$538 - $1,017 $766 $186 $118
(-35.9%) (-) (67.8%) (51.0%) (12.4%) (7.9%)
Non-Switchers $953 - -$249 -$371 -$442 -$382
(63.5%) (-) (-16.6%) (-24.8%) (-29.4%) (-25.4%)
High Expense $936 - $38 $84 $62 $121
(62.4%) (-) (2.6%) (5.6%) (4.2%) (8.1%)
Non-High Expense $22 - -$52 -$93 -$137 -$136
(1.5%) (-) (-3.5%) (-6.2%) (-9.2%) (-9.1%)
Single -$683 - -$153 -$295 -$319 -$286
(-45.5%) (-) (-10.2%) (-19.7%) (-21.2%) (-19.0%)
Family $826 - -$54 $119 $61 $47
(55%) (-) (3.6%) (7.9%) (4.1%) (3.1%)
Low Income -$349 - -$75 -$153 -$200 -$190
(-23.3%) (-) (-5.0%) (-10.2%) (-13.3%) (-12.7%)
High Income $806 - $10 $43 $0 $13
(53.7%) (-) (0.6%) (2.9%) (0) (0.9%)
Table 11: This table shows the welfare change of a range of policy interventions, in terms of eectiveness,
relative to the baseline where preferences are as estimated in table 7. In addition, we present results on the
welfare loss from adverse selection in the actual environment relative to the rst-best. The chart reports the
change in the mean per employee per year certainty equivalent in each environment, relative to the baseline
case. In parentheses, we include the percentage corresponding to this certainty equivalent change divided
by mean employee premiums paid per employee per year. Column 1 shows how the rst-best compares
to the baseline and reveals that the mean welfare loss from adverse selection in the current information
environment is $123 or 8.2% of total premiums paid in the baseline. Columns 3 through 6 correspond to
dierent counterfactual environments where switching costs have been reduced relative to the baseline. We
study four cases, when switching costs are assumed to be 75%, 50%, 25%, and 0% of baseline switching costs
respectively. We report welfare results for the population as well as dierent segments of the population.
The 25% counterfactual is examined in more detail in table 10.
62Full Equilibrium Information Provision
Switching Costs Analysis
 .75 .5 .25 0
t1 SC / Switcher 1,982 1,502 1,010 506 0
Switcher % 14% 19% 21% 23% 32%
Avg. SC Pop. 291 284 216 118 0
t2 SC / Switcher 1,959 1,488 1001 506 0
Switcher % 14% 17% 20% 23% 25%
Avg. SC Pop. 269 252 201 117 0
t4 SC / Switcher 1,973 1,506 982 480 0
Switcher % 7% 10% 11% 12% 15%
Avg. SC Pop. 144 156 109 56 0
t6 SC / Switcher 1,942 1,451 962 483 0
Switcher % 6% 8% 10% 12% 16%
Avg. SC Pop. 110 109 90 60 0
Avg. t1-t6 SC / Switcher 1,963 1,489 988 493 0
Switcher % 9% 13% 14% 17% 20%
Avg. SC Pop. 185 188 142 83 0
Welfare Impact  .75 .5 .25 0
 = 0 Welfare Relevant SC 0 0 0 0 0
 CEQ (% Premiums) - -$41 (-2.7%) -$73 (-4.9%) -$115 (-7.7%) -$107 (-7.1%)
 = 0:25 Welfare Relevant SC 46 47 36 21 0
 CEQ (% Premiums) - -$42 (-2.8%) -$63 (-4.2%) -$90 (-6.0%) -$61 (-4.1%)
 = 0:5 Welfare Relevant SC 93 94 71 42 0
 CEQ (% Premiums) - -$42 (-2.8%) -$51 (-3.4%) -$64 (-4.3%) -$14 (-0.9%)
 = 1 Welfare Relevant SC 185 188 142 83 0
 CEQ (% Premiums) - -$44 (-2.9%) -$30 (-2.0%) -$13 (-0.9%) -$78 (5.2%)
Table 12: Table 12 expands the welfare analysis to account for the possibility that some proportion of
estimated, and subsequently reduced, switching costs should be included in the welfare analysis. Tables 10
and 11 present results conditional on  = 0 (switching costs are not welfare relevant) while this table presents
results across the range of  from 0 to 1 (all switching costs are welfare relevant). The top panel of this table
studies the prole of switching costs incurred for dierent Z from t1 to t6, while the bottom panel assesses the
welfare impact of these interventions as a function of . The table reveals that for almost all combinations
of  and Z, there is a negative welfare impact from reduced switching costs and better consumer decisions.
63Final Sample
Cost Model Output
Overall PPO250 PPO500 PPO1200
Individual Mean (Median)
Unscaled ACG Predictor
Mean 1.42 0.74 0.72
Median 0.83 0.37 0.37
Pharmacy: Model Output
Zero Claim Pr. 0.35 (0.37) 0.31 (0.18) 0.40 (0.37) 0.42 (0.37)
Weibull  1182 (307) 1490 (462) 718 (307) 596 (307)
Weibull  0.77 (0.77) 0.77 (0.77) 0.77 (0.77) 0.77 (0.77)
Mental Health
Zero Claim Pr. 0.88 (0.96) 0.87 (0.96) 0.90 (0.96) 0.90 (0.96)
Weibull  1422 (1295) 1447 (1295) 1374 (1295) 1398 (1295)
Weibull  0.98 (0.97) 0.99 (0.97) 0.98 (0.97) 0.98 (0.97)
Hospital / Physician
Zero Claim Pr. 0.23 (0.23) 0.21 (0.23) 0.26 (0.23) 0.26 (0.23)
Weibull  2214 (1599) 2523 (1599) 1717 (1599) 1652 (1599)
Weibull  0.58 (0.55) 0.59 (0.55) 0.55 (0.55) 0.55 (0.55)
(> $40;000) Claim Pr. 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Physician OV
Zero Claim Pr. 0.29 (0.20) 0.26 (0.20) 0.33 (0.46) 0.34 (0.46)
Weibull  605 (553) 653 (553) 517 (410) 529 (410)
Weibull  1.15 (1.14) 1.15 (1.14) 1.15 (1.14) 1.14 (1.14)
Correlations
Rank Correlation Hospital-Pharm. 0.28 (0.34) 0.26 (0.32) 0.31 (0.34) 0.32 (0.34)
Rank Correlation Hospital-OV 0.73 (0.74) 0.72 (0.74) 0.74 (0.74) 0.74 (0.74)
Rank Correlation Pharm.-OV 0.35 (0.41) 0.33 (0.37) 0.38 (0.41) 0.39 (0.41)
Table 13: This table describes the output of the cost model in terms of the means and medians of individual
level parameters, classied by the plan actually chosen. These parameters are aggregated for these groups
but have more micro-level groupings, which are the primary inputs into our cost projections in the choice
model. Weibull , Weibull , and Zero Claim Probability correspond to the cell-specic predicted total
individual-level health expenses as described in more detail in Appendix A.
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